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Sex Discrimination in Britain,




In 1957, six European states signed the Treaty of Rome' and estab-
lished thereby the European Economic Community or "Common Market,
"a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own
personality, and its own legal capacity."' 2 The European Community is an
economic confederation aimed ultimately at a "United States of Eu-
rope," and its founding fathers drew up the Treaty as an embryo Consti-
tution,4 left deliberately open ended to allow the Community to develop
and to achieve aims unforeseen in 1957. The European Community5 cur-
* Christopher Docksey is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Exeter. LL.M., Univer-
sity of Virginia, 1976; M.A., Cambridge University, 1974; Visiting Professor of Law, Mar-
shall-Wyethe School of Law & William and Mary School of Law, 1982-83. Mr. Docksey is a
member of the English and Welsh bars.
1. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community Mar. 25, 1957,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. [hereinafter
cited as the Treaty of Rome or EEC Treaty].
2. Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L. [1964] E. Comm. J.Rep. 585, 593, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
425, 455 (1964). See infra note 11.
3. "We must build a kind of United States of Europe." Speech by Winston Churchill,
Zurich University (Sept. 19, 1946). The first step by the Six was to place national coal and
steel production under a common supra national authority, the European Coal and Steel
Community, in 1951, See infra note 5. Attempts at political integration via a European
Defense Community and a European Political Community were set back by the collapse of
the European Defense Treaty in 1954, but were resumed by the Six at the Messina Confer-
ence in June, 1955. The Conference resolved to "pursue the establishment of a United Eu-
rope through the development of common institutions, a progressive fusion of national econ-
omies, the creation of a Common Market and harmonisation of social policies," and led to
the Treaty of Rome in 1957, note 1 supra. For the historical background, see R. MAYNE, THE
RECOVERY OF EUROPE 194573 (rev. ed. 1973); R. VAUGHAN, TWENTIETHCENTURY EUROPE:
PATHS TO UNITY (1979).
4. "[T]he EEC Treaty has, in a sense, the character of a genuine constitution, the con-
stitution of the Community ... but for the greater part, the Treaty has above all the char-
acter of what we call a 'loi-cadre;' and this is a perfectly legitimate approach when one is
dealing with a situation of an evolutionary nature such as the establishment of a Common
Market .... " Submissions of Advocate General Lagrange, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425, 442 (1964).
5. The "Community" consists of three Communities: Coal and Steel (The Treaty Insti-
tuting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S 140); the Euro-
pean Economic Community (note 1 supra); and, Euratom (The Treaty Creating the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169). Since 1967 the
Communities have been administered by common institutions - A Commission, Council,
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rently has ten member States,e with two more to follow shortly,7 and to-
day it resembles a functional quasifederal entity8 rather than a simple
international economic confederation such as E.F.T.A.s or G.A.T.T.1"
The quasi-federal nature of Community law, commonly known as
"functional federalism", flows from its status as a new, independent and
autonomous legal order,1" and is supreme over the national law of the
Parliament, and Court of Justice. See Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the
European Communities, Mar.25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 267, and Treaty Establishing a Single
Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities (Merger Treaty), Apr. 8,
1965, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd 5179). For a discussion of the Communities and their
Institutions, See P.S.R.F MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (3rd ed. 1980).
See also D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITmES (3d ed. 1982).
6. Denmark, Eire and the United Kingdom joined in 1973. See Treaty of Accession to
the European Economic Community, Jan. 22, 1972, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179).
Norway signed, but was unable to ratify the Treaty, following a negative Referendum, and
did not become a member. Greece joined in 1981. See Second Treaty of Accession, May 28,
1979, 291 O.J.L. 9 (Nov. 19, 1979).
7. It was hoped that Spain and Portugal would become members of the Community
simultaneously in 1983, but complex negotiations have delayed both applications and it also
seems likely that Portugal will be ready in advance of Spain. See School's Brief: The En-
larging of Europe, The Economist, Dec. 18, 1982, at 58-9, col. 3.
8. The Community was also labelled early on a "prefederal association." Mueller-Graff,
Direct Elections to the European Parliament, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1979). See
Bride, American Analogues in the Law of the European Community, 11 ANGLO-AM. L.R.
131 (1982).
9. Concerned about the impact of the original European Economic Community on
trade, the seven countries of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom joined in a cooperative regional economic integration movement,
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), under the Stockholm Convention in 1960.
Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 3.
Later joined by Finland and Iceland, the EFTA sought to remove internal barriers to trade,
such as tariffs and quantitative import quotas, and to this extent has been largely success-
ful. Unlike the EEC, EFTA has not sought to achieve political union. See S. ROBOCK, K.
SIMMONDS & J. ZWICK, INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 135-36
(rev. ed. 1977).
10. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Pts. 5 & 6,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 186, commonly known as GATT, is the principal multilateral
arrangement directed toward establishing a free system of trade by substantially reducing
tariffs and other nontariff barriers to trade and by eliminating discriminatory treatment.
Becoming effective in 1948, GATT now has over eighty members. The Agreement provides
governing the conduct of international trade in the areas of customs, licensing, government
procurement, and such; and (3) consultations among Members to establish policies and re-
solve disputes. See generally K. W. DAM, THE GATT; LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION (1970); J. H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); S.
ROBOCK, K. SIMMONDS & J. ZWICK, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES 127-30 (rev. ed. 1977); H. STmNER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
1141-75 (2d ed. 1976).
11. See Flaminio Costa, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 425, 439 (submissions of Advocate Gen-
eral Lagrange). This case is the cornerstone of the doctrine of supremacy; the Court of Jus-
tice declared:
[T]he Treaty instituting the E.E.C. has created its own order which was inte-
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member States.12 One of the principal areas of Community "federal" ju-
risdiction is the improvement and harmonisation of "social" law, which
includes the enhancement of protection against sex discrimination in the
workplace. The law here is of special interest to Americans, because it not
only draws from American jurisprudence but also has something to offer
in return.
One member State, the United Kingdom, developed an advanced
code of gender discrimination protection before the relevant Community
Law became operative. British Ministers travelled to the United States to
examine American law in this area, and the relevant British legislation,
though obviously targeted on specific local needs and tradition,"8 drew
grated with the national order of the memberStates the moment the Treaty
came into force; as such, it is binding upon them. In fact, by creating a Com-
munity of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality
and its own capacity in law, apart from having international standing and more
particularly, real powers resulting from a limitation of competence or a trans-
fer of powers from the States to the Community, the member-States, albeit
within limited spheres, have restricted their sovereign rights and created a
body of law applicable both to their nationals and to themselves. The recep-
tion, within the laws of each member-State, of provisions having a Community
source, and more particularly of the terms and of the spirit of the Treaty, has
as a corolary the impossibility, for the member-State, to give preference to a
unilateral and subsequent measure against a legal order accepted by them on a
basis of reciprocity.
Id. at 455. Cf. Wyatt, New Legal Order or Old?, 7 EUR. L. REV. 147 (1982).
12. Flaminio Costa, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 455. See also Amministrazione delle Finanze
dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A. (No. 2), [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 629, 23 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 263 (1978), currently the highwater mark of the doctrine of supremacy, see Note, Has
the "Incoming Tide" Reached the Palace of Westminster?, 95 L.Q. REv. 167 (1979). Within
its own terms, Community law is supreme over any form of prior or subsequent national
law, and national courts in practice give effect to this doctrine. J. USHER, EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW: THE IRREVERSIBLE TRANSFER (1981). Although supremacy is
limited to the scope of Community Law, that scope, in areas such as social and commercial
law, is constantly increasing, e.g., remarks of Lord Denning M.R. in H.P. Bulmer Ltd. v. J.
Bollinger S.A., [1974] Ch. 401, at 418:
[T]he Treaty covers only those matters which have a European element....
The Treaty does not touch any of the matters which concern solely England
and the people in it. These are still governed by English law. They are not
affected by the Treaty. But when we come to matters with a European ele-
ment, the Treaty is like an incoming tide.
13. It should be strongly emphasized, however, that sexism in both systems has oper-
ated in a very similar manner in both countries in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.
Women were simultaneously excluded from the legal profession in the United States,
Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. 130 (1873)(Illinois state law prohibiting women from practic-
ing law upheld), and from the medical profession in Scotland, JexBlake v. Senatus of the
University of Edinburgh, 11 M. 784 (1873). Women had to wait half a century to gain the
right to vote, in 1918 in the United Kingdom and 1920 in the United States. For a compara-
tive history of women and the law up to the present, see A. SACHS & J. WILSON, SEXISM AND
THE LAW, A STUDY OF MALE BELIEFS AND JUDICIAL BIAS (1978).
It made no difference whether the judges were operating in the context of the
British system which enshrines the supremacy of Parliament, or whether they
1984
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heavily on American theory and practice. Indeed, as will be seen, the
British legislation sought to improve upon perceived inadequacies in
American law. However, the European Community provisions were devel-
oped independently of U.S. law and have led to a series of cases from the
United Kingdom seeking to strike down provisions of United Kingdom
law allegedly inconsistent with Community law."' By an ironic twist of
fate, American theory has been used by the European Court of Justice to
analyze the inadequacy of provisions of United Kingdom law; provisions
inspired by American jurisprudence. This article will review the legal re-
sponses to common problems of gender discrimination arising in the
United States, Britain, and the European Community.
II. THE LEGAL STRUCTURES' 5
The United States has enjoyed a system of federal anti-discrimina-
tion law for almost two decades. In 1963, the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1933 (FLSA) s was augmented by the Equal Pay Act 17 which required
that men and women performing "equal work" in the same establishment
should receive equal pay."8 An aggrieved party may resort to the federal
courts under the normal FLSA procedure.' 9 The second major anti-dis-
crimination statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, was passed the fol-
lowing year, 1964.0 Under Title VII, it is an unfair employment practice
for those covered by the legislation 21 to discriminate in employment op-
portunities: hiring, firing, conditions in employment, promotion, benefits,
functioned in terms of the American Constitution guaranteeing individual
rights .... The prevailing conception of womenhood proved to be a far more
compelling determinant of judicial behavior than the terms of the statute or
the words of the Constitution!
Id. at 225-26.
14. MacCarthy's Ltd. v. Smith, [1979] 3 All E.R. 325 (C.A.), [1981] 1 All E.R. 111
(E.C.J.), 120 (C.A.), noted in Schofield, 9 INDUS. L. J. 173 (1980); Worringham v. Lloyds
Bank Ltd., 27 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 293 (E.A.T.), 302 (C.A.) (1980), [1981] Indus. Cas. R. 558
(E.C.J.), [1982] Indus. Cas. R. 299 (C.A.); Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd.,
[1980] INDUS. REL. L.R. 6 (E.A.T.), 31 COMM. MKT. L.R. 24 (E.C.J.) (1981), [1981] INDUS.
CAS. R. 715 (E.A.T.), noted in 4 EUR. L. REV. 193 (1980)(Court of Justice decisions); Eileen
Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., [1979] Indus. Cas. R. 558 (C.A.); [1982] INDUS.
CAs. R. 420 (E.C.J. and H.L.) Burton v. British Railways Board; [19821 Indus. Cas. R. 329
(E.C.J.). It is not surprising that the United Kingdom has provided all the recent art. 177
references to the Court of Justice in this arena; (see note 35, supra), the British legislation
is extensive and specific, was passed without reference to the developing European legisla-
tion, and provides easy and swift remedial access.
15. For a broad survey of legal protections in the United States and the United King-
dom, see Covington, American and British Employment Discrimination Law: An Introduc-
tory Comparative Survey, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359 (1977).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1976).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(1976). Pub. L. No. 8838 (1963), 77 Stat. 56.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)(1976).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(17) (1976).
21. See infra note 28.
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etc.-on the ground, inter alia,22 of sex. An aggrieved individual must
initially file a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) 23 or the appropriate state or local fair employment agency.24
If the EEOC is unsuccessful in conciliating or settling the issue, the com-
plainant may proceed de novo before the ordinary courts. 25 Administra-
tive enforcement and review of both statutes is entrusted to the EEOC. 26
In the United Kingdom, there are two fairly specific analogues to the
American legislation, the Equal Pay Act of 19702" and the Sex Discrimi-
nation Act of 1975.28 The two Acts came into force on the same date,
22. Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion or na-
tional origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2) (1976). It is commonly thought that "sex" was added to
the grounds of discrimination as a careless afterthought, or even to "kill the Bill," but a
recent analysis of the legislative history concludes that Congress' extension of Title VII to
cover sex discrimination was deliberate and purposeful. See Gold, A Tale of Two Amend-
ments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII, and Their Implication for the Issue
of Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 453 (1981).
23. Claims must be filed within 180 days of the unfair employment practice. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(5)(e)(1976). For EEOC practice and procedure in dealing with complaints, see Katz,
Investigation and Conciliation of Employment Discrimination Charges under Title VII:
Employment Rights in an Adversary Process, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (1977).
24. In which case, the period of limitation to file a complaint with the EEOC under
Title VII is extended to 300 days, or to within 30 days of notification that the State or local
agency has terminated proceedings under State or local law, whichever is the earlier. 42
U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(5)(e) (1976).
25. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976)(federal employees have same right to
trial de novo as private employees); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974)(federal courts not bound to refer to arbitrator's decision but should consider em-
ployee's claim de novo; doctrines of election of remedies and waiver, and federal policy re-
specting arbitration do not limit independent access under Title VII); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (charging party is not limited to EEOC determination of
"reasonable cause" in instituting court action).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5) (1976). For a topical survey of the work of the EEOC, see
LEACH & OWENS, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY TODAY: A TIME OF SCRUTINY AND EvALU-
ATION (1981). Enforcement was originally the responsibility of the Wages and Hour Division
of the United States Department of Labor. Jurisdiction was transferred to the EEOC under
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, effective July 1, 1979. Enforcement had been divided for
many years because the EEOC was seen as primarily concerned with racial discrimination
under Title VII. Therefore, it was thought that a separate enforcement body to focus on sex
discrimination in pay would be appropriate. In the United Kingdom, there are still separate
enforcement agencies for race discrimination, the Commission of Racial Equality (Part VII,
Race Relations Act 1976), and sex discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission (Part VI, Sex Discrimination Act 1975). The British provisions and agencies are
not limited to employment discrimination but also cover education and the provision of
goods and services.
27. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41 (as amended by Sex Discrimination Act 1975).
28. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65 [hereinafter cited Sex Discrimination Act].
Part II of the Sex Discrimination Act, entitled "Discrimination in the Employment Field,
amended the Equal Pay Act 1970. In the main, coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e(17) and the Sex Discrimination Act, Part II, relating to
employment is very similar. Both protect "employees," those working or seeking work (42
U.S.C. § 2000e(f); Sex Discrimination Act §§ 6(1), (2)) from discrimination by "employers"
(42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Sex Discrimination Act § 6) "labor organizations" (42 U.S.C. §
2000e(e)) or "trade unions" (Sex Discrimination Act § 12) and "employment agencies" (42
1984
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
December 29, 1975, and together form a more or less harmonious code
against sex discrimination. Both statutes are administered by the Equal
Opportunities Commission (EOC), a statutory body created for this pur-
pose by the Sex Discrimination Act. 9 Aggrieved individuals may present
a complaint under either Act directly to the local statutory labor court
known as the "Industrial Tribunal." s
In 1971, the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Accession and
subjected United Kingdom law to Community law.3 1 In the area of gender
U.S.C. 2000e(c); Sex Discrimination Act § 15). There is a minimum qualifying number of
employees (15 under Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and 6 under the Sex Discrimination Act
§ 6(3)(b), which also exempts private households Sex Discrimination Act § 6(3)(a)). On July
25, 1980, the European Commission decided to commence infringement proceedings under
article 169 of the Treaty of Rome (note 1 supra) against the United Kingdom on the basis
that the Sec. 6(3) exclusion of private households and small businesses is contrary to article
2 of the Equal Treatment Directive, 76/207/EEC. Europe, July 26, 1980 (magazine) at 8.
One major difference is the protection against "marriage bar" discrimination under Sec. 3 of
the Sex Discrimination Act, see infra Part IV of text.
29. See Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 28, Part VI (regarding composition and
duties of the Equal Opportunities Commission) Part VII (enforcement) and sched. 3 (incor-
poration, personnel and finance). See Byrne and Lovenduski, Sex Equality and the Law in
Britain, 5 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 148 (1978).
30. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41 § 2; Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 28, § 63. See
also Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44 § 128, sched. 9. The Indus-
trial Tribunal has jurisdiction over all statutory individual employment rights. It comprises
a panel intended to be an "industrial jury" consisting of a legally qualified chairman sup-
ported by two "wing" persons representing either side of industry. Appeals on law are to the
Employment Appeal Tribunal [hereinafter EAT], a superior court of record, in London for
England and Wales, and Edinburgh for Scotland. See Employment Protection (Consolida-
tion) Act, 1978, ch. 44, §§ 135, 136 and sched. 11. See Phillips, Some Notes on the EAT, 7
INDUs. L.J. 137 (1978). Appeals thence are in the normal way to the Court of Appeal and the
House of Lords. At any stage, a Tribunal or Court may refer a question on Community Law
to the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg under article 177 of the Treaty of Rome
(note 1 supra). See infra note 35.
31. The actual date of subordination is January 1st, 1973, but for totally different rea-
sons under British constitutional law and Community law. Under the former, treatymaking
falls under the Royal Prerogative, and international obligations incurred by the Crown have
no internal effect unless and until transformed by Act of Parliament into municipal law:
Within the British Empire there is a wellestablished rule that the making of a
treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they en-
tail alteration of the existing domestic law, requires legislative action. Unlike
some other countries, the stipulations of a treaty duly ratified do not within
the Empire, by virtue of the treaty alone, have the force of law.
Per Lord Atkin, Attorney-Genera" ... r Cana,. v. Attorney-General for Ontario, f 1937] A.C.
326, 347.
Thus, for example, the European Convention of Human Rights has no internal legal
effect. Ahmad v. I.L.E.A., [1978] 1 All E.R. 574. Community law is only part of British law
insofar as it has been incorporated by the European Communities Act, 1972 ch. 68, which
came into force on January 1st, 1973. For the modes of transformation adopted by the Act
see Mitchell, Kuipers & Gall, Constitutional Aspects of the Treaty and Legislation Relat-
ing to British Membership, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 134 (1972). The situation is different in
the other member states. See K. LIPSTmN, THE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMU-
NITY Ch. 2, pt. X (1974).
In contrast, the critical date under Community law is the ratification and entry into
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discrimination, there are two levels of enforcement under Community
law: by individuals under Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, and by the
European Commission under the Equal Pay and Equal Treatment
Directives.
First, article 119 obliges member states to: "[E]nsure and subse-
quently maintain the application of the principle that men and women
should receive equal pay for equal work.' '3 2 Article 119 has been held to
be "directly effective,""3 that is, it is a provision of Community law which
confers rights on individuals which they may enforce before their national
courts. 4 Individuals may thus plead article 119 before United Kingdom
force of the Treaty of Accession of January 22nd, 1972, which was, coincidentally, January
1st, 1973. Like ratification of the Treaty of Rome by the original Six this constituted a
definitive extraconstitutional political act constituting a new legal order. See submissions of
Procureur-General Touffait in Administration des Douanes v. Soc. Cafas Jacques Vabre, 16
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 336, 364 (French Cour de Cassation) (1975), discussed in Simon and
Dowrick, Effect of EEC Directives in France: The Views of the of the Conseil d'Etat, 95
L.Q. REV. 376 (1979). See also L. COLLINS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN THE UNITED KING-
DOM Ch. 1 (2d ed. 1980); Dagtoglou, European Communities and Constitutional Law, 32
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 256 (1973); Trinidade, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Primacy of Eu-
ropean Community Law, 35 MOD. L. REv 375 (1972).
32. The full text of article 119 is as follows:
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently main-
tain the application of the principle that men and women should receive equal
pay for equal work.
For the purpose of this Article, 'pay' means the ordinary basic or mini-
mum wage or salary and any other consideration which the worker receives,
directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, from his employer in respect
of his employment.
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means: (a) that pay for the
same work at piece-rates shall be calculated on the basis of the same unit of
measurement; (b) that pay for work at time-rates shall be the same for the
same job.
Article 119 is perhaps the most dynamic provision of social law in the Treaty of Rome,
but was included in the Treaty at the insistence of France for reasons of national selfinter-
est. The Preamble to the French Constitution of 1946, confirmed by the 1958 Constitution,
requires equal rights for women men "in all spheres." This was particularized into a duty to
pay equally for work of equal value by the Act of 22nd December 1972 (Code du travail, art.
L. 1402). See F. SCHMIDT, DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: A STUDY OF SIX COUNTRIES BY
THE COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW GROUP 142 (1978). France was concerned lest her textile in-
dustry, heavily serviced by women, would be at a competitive disadvantage as against textile
producers in other Common Market nations. See Szyszczak, Problems of Equal Pay Within
the EEC Perspective, 131 New L.J. 39 (1981).
See also submission of Belgium to the Court of Justice in the first Defrenne case: "The
Belgian State, represented by the Minister of Social Security, states that Article 119 of the
Treaty has only an economic objective, since its aim is to avoid discrepancies in cost prices
due to the employment of female labour less well paid for the same work than male labour."
Defrenne v. Belgium, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 445, 449.
33. Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. Rep. 455, 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 98.
34. N.V. Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Neder-
landse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1. See Bebr, Directly Ap-
plicable Provisions of Community Law: The Development of a Community Concept, 19
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 257 (1970); Steiner, The Application of European Community law in
1984
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courts3" in addition to the Equal Pay Act and the Sex Discrimination Act,
or in preference to the national legislation where such is inferior.3 6
Second, pursuant to the European Social Action Programme of
1974,s" there are two binding directives on sexual equality in the work
place. 8 The Equal Pay Directive amplifies article 119 and, inter alia, rad-
ically extends the scope of the principle of "equal pay."3 9 The Equal
National Courts Problems, Pitfalls and Percepts, 96 L.Q. REV 126 (1980); Warner, The
Relationship between European Community law and the National Laws of Member States,
93 L.Q. REV. 349 (1977); Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect, 9 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 425 (1972).
35. There is no system of "federal" courts to enforce Community Law. National courts
interpret and apply their own national law, and as "common law" (i.e., Community) courts
apply Community law where the law is clear. Where there is a question of interpretation of
Community law, any court or tribunal may, and every court of final jurisdiction must, refer
the question to the Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, or "prelim inary ruling" under
art. 177 of the Treaty of Rome. Art. 177 establishes the Court of Justice as the final and
authoritative arbiter of Community law under the Treaty System of "organic cooperation
between the two orders of jurisdiction." Per Advocate General Lagrange, Flaminio Costa v.
E.N.E.L., 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 438, 443-44 (1964). See generally, Barav, Some Aspects of the
Preliminary Rulings Procedure in EEC Law, 2 EUR. L. REv. 3 (1977); BRIDGE, Community
Law and English Courts and Tribunals: General Principles and Preliminary Rulings, 1
EUR. L. REV. 13 (1976); GRAY, Advisory Opinions and the European Court of Justice, 8
EUR. L. REv. 24 (1983). An attempt by the British Court of Appeal to restrict the privilege
of the lower courts to ask for a preliminary ruling was found to be inconsistent with art. 177
and may not necessarily be authoritative. H.P. BULMER LTD. v. J. BOLLINGER S.A., [1974]
Ch. 401, 420-426. See, e.g., Pigs Marketing Board v. Redmond, 22 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 697,
706-07 (1978).
36. Note 14 supra.
37. Council Resolution on a Social Action Programme of 21 Jan. 1974, 17 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C13) 1 (1974). The Council of the Communities expressed the political will to
achieve certain objectives, including the attainment of full and better employment in the
Community, during a first stage over the period 1974-1976. Specific priorities include: (1)
action to ensure equality between men and women regarding access to employment, to voca-
tional guidance and training, and in respect of work conditions and pay; (2) the reconcilia-
tion of family responsibilities with the professional aspirations of the people concerned. On
Dec. 9, 1981 the Commission submitted a memorandum to the Council proposing a New
Community Action Programme on the Promotion of Equal Opportunities for Women 1982-
1985, Com(81) 758 final. The Commission proposed specific action to (1) strengthen the
rights of the individual as a way of achieving equal treatment, involving closer monitoring of
the Directives, new legal measures, and specific guidelines with regard to unfamiliar con-
cepts, such as indirect discrimination, and (2) achieve equal opportunities in practice, in-
volving vocational and educational initiatives.
Towards these ends, the Commission has set up an Advisory Committee on Equal Op-
portunities for Women and Men to advise the Commission and coordinate activities of na-
tional bodies (such as the EOC). Decision of Dec. 9, 1981, 37 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 20) 35
(1982).
38. A third, on social security, Directive 79/7/EEC, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 6) 24
(1979), gives the member States until 1985 to implement its requirements. This is an unusu-
ally long implementation period, and was castigated by Parliamentarians as excessively long
and "astonishingly smug." Remarks of Mrs. Dunwoody, O.J.EuR. COMM. (No. 237) 135 (Dec.
13, 1978) (Debates of European Parliament).
39. Council Directive 75/117/EEC, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 45) 19 (1975), art. 1(1).
"The principle of equal pay for men and women ... means, for the same work or for work
VOL. 13:2-3
SEX DISCRIMINATION
Treatment Directive"' is an independent and novel provision4 1 which re-
quires equal opportunities to be provided to men and women in voca-
tional training4 2 and employment4 . The Court of Jusice has stressed that
only article 119 is directly effective and enforceable by individuals. The
Directives are detailed guidelines for member States, setting out objec-
tives which must be implemented by national legislation in each State.
Individuals must bring suit under their own national law, rather than the
Directives. National legislation is monitored by the European Commis-
sion in Brussels. Recourse to the Court of Justice ensures, if necessary,
that the legislation adequately fulfills the requirements of the
Directives.""
III. "SEx" DISCRIMINATION
An employer discriminates on the grounds of sex when it treats a
woman less favorably'3 than a man". Three basic problems of definition
to which equal value is attributed, the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of sex
with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration." See Part V of text, infra.
40. Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 40 (1976).
41. The Equal Treatment Directive was made under the general legislative authority of
art. 235 of the Treaty of Rome, implementing arts. 117 and 118. Also, the Social Action
Programme is a good example of the openended nature, traite cadre, of the Treaty of Rome.
42. Art. 4 of the Directive, note 40 supra, includes "all types and ... all levels of voca-
tional guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining." The Eu-
ropean Commission has informed the U.K. Government that Sec.20 of the Sex Discrimina-
tion Act, which excludes the training and employment of midwives from the scope of the
Act, is contrary to the Directive. See London Times, Apr. 24, 1981, at 3, col. 6 (Discrimina-
tory to compel male nurse in Sunderland to travel to Scotland or London to study because
only two nursing schools in U.K. admit male midwifery students). The Commission rejected
the frequently offered justification of privacy as applicable to midwifery, stating that it is
not one of the occupations excluded by art. 2(2) of the Directive in which "by reason of their
nature or the context in which they are carried out, the sex of the worker constitutes a
determining factor." See London Times, July 26, 1980, at 4, col. 1.
A contrary view was taken by an Arkansas District Court, which held that a male nurse
could lawfully be excluded under the BFOQ exception to Title VII from a hospital's labor
and delivery rooms in order to protect patients' "privacy and personal dignity." Backus v.
Baptist Medical Center, 510 F.Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100
(8th Cir. 1982). Personal privacy of patients justified a BFOQ exception in Fesel v. Masonic
Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F.Supp. 1346 (D.Del. 1978), afl'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir.
1979). See Comment, Sex Discrimination Justified under Title VII: Privacy Rights in
Nursing Homes, 14 VAL. U.L. REv. 577 (1980).
43. Art. 3 requires equality of treatment with regard to hiring and promotion, and art. 5
requires equality of working conditions, including conditions governing dismissal. See Part
IV of text, infra.
44. The Commission enforces Directives under art. 169 of the Treaty of Rome. The
Commission first writes to the member State concerned and sets out its views on the alleged
infringement of the Directive. If the member State does not provide an answer satisfactory
to the Commission and refuses to amend its legislation in line with the Commission's views,
the Commission may initiate suit before the Court of Justice. The decision of the Court is
final, and its terms must be implemented by a member State found to be in default.
45. "'Disparate Treatment' . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination.
The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
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arise: what is a "woman"; does discrimination on the grounds of sexual
preference constitute "gender" discrimination; and, is sexual harassment
(a phenomenon falling within the same cultural spectrum as rape4") an
evil which may properly be remedied by anti-discrimination legislation.
All three involve prejudice and cultural conditioning at the deepest level;
none were contemplated by the legislature when it considered the
legislation.
The woman who claims to be a man, or vice-versa, can present
problems to an employer in the context of affirmative action programmes
or protective legislation. At one level, the absurdity of cultural stereotyp-
ing is exposed when the same individual can step from one sex to the
other, and presumably be no better or worse a car mechanic or secretary
than before. At a deeper level, the transsexual will ask, who has the major
say on gender identity, the individual or the State? In one case, a person
was lawfully discharged under protective legislation because s/he was bio-
logically female, i.e., had the ability to bear a child, notwithstanding a
personal decision at the age of seven to be a male.4 8 In Britain, so far,
Freud's maxim still holds true- "anatomy is destiny." Elsewhere, a con-
trary approach is gaining favor, that the right to determine one's physical
and psychological identity is a fundamental personal right which must be
recognized by the State. Authorities to this effect in California,49 the Fed-
color, religion, sex or national origin." International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431
U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977)(Stewart, J.). cf. Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 28, § 1(1)(1):
"A person discriminates against a woman. . . if on the ground of her sex he treats her less
favourably than he treats or would treat a man."
46. Or vice versa. Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 28, § 2. "Equality is the order of
the day. In both directions. For both sexes." Ministry of Defence v. Jeremiah, [1979] 3 All
E.R. 833, 836 (Lord Denning M.R.).
47. Sexual harassment and rape both involve invasion of the woman's personal privacy
and human dignity, the employment of superior power, economic or physical, and feelings of
shame and humiliation. See Montgomery, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 10
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 879, 880 (1980). Both tend to be underreported. See S. BROWNMIL-
LER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 175 (1975). See generally C.A. MAcKINNAN,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
48. White v. British Sugar Corp., [1977] Indus. Rel. L. R. 121. See also Corbett v. Cor-
bett, 1971 P. 83. The issue was the validity of an alleged marriage involving a male transsex-
ual who had undergone surgery to become a female. The court held that sexual identity is
determined conclusively at birth and consists not only of the genital but also of the chromo-
somal and gonadal attributes of that person. This approach has been strongly criticised, see
Walton, When is a Woman Not a Woman?, 124 NEW L.J. 501 (1974); Pannick, Homosexu-
als, Transsexuals and the Sex Discrimination Act, 1983 PUBLIC LAW 279.
49. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (1976). A male transsexual had a sex change operation,
married and lived with her husband for two years. The court held she was a woman because
she had changed her genital anatomy to accord with her sense of self-identity as a female
and had brought about the necessary congruence between her psyche and genital features.
"Sex (is) one's selfimage, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and
character." Id. at 209. See also Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1977)(Goodwin, J., dissenting). "When a transsexual completes his or her transition from
one sexual identity to another, that person will have a sexual classification. Assuming that
this plaintiff has now undergone her planned surgery, she is ... female ...." Id. at 664.
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eral Republic of Germany, 50 and under the European Convention of
Human Rights5", are a powerful influence on the United Kingdom and
American jurisdictions to allow transsexuals to require the law to recog-
nize their new sexual identity.
It is interesting to contrast this progressive definitional response to
transsexuality with the legal response to the second problem, sexual pref-
erence. Discrimination against homosexuals, the so-called "third sex,"
consistently provides clear examples of cultural stereotyping and
prejudice, 2 but such discrimination is not characterised in any jurisdic-
tion as "sex" discrimination." None the less, certain individuals are par-
ticularly prone to suffer arbitrary discharge simply because of their sexual
preferences, unlike other individuals whose sexual preferences are socially
acceptable. In America and the United Kingdom, homosexuals are forced
to resort to alternative, less specific, legal remedies, 4 where they must
rebut what is effectively a presumption of wrongful behavior inferred
from their homosexuality by demonstrating that their sexual preferences
have no impact upon their jobs.5 5 Homosexuals are likely to remain rela-
50. Decision of Bundesverfassungsgericht of October 11, 1978, Juris tenzeitung 34, 64
(1979). German Basic Law arts. 1.1 (dignity of man) and 2.1 (free development of personal-
ity) require sex of person to be determined according to his/her psychical and physical con-
stitution; a transsexual is therefore able to require correction of sex on birth register.
51. D. Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 476 (Eur.
Comm'n on Human Rights). The Commission ruled that the refusal of transsexual's request
to amend his sex entry on the Belgian civil status register from female to male was a viola-
tion of arts. 8 (respect for life) and 12 (right to marry) of the Convention. See Note, 6 Eur.
L. Rev. 67 (1981).
52. See generally Rivera, On Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosex-
ual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979); Warner, Homophobia,
"Manifest Homosexuals" and Political Activity: A New Approach to Gay Rights and the
'Issue' of Homosexuality, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 635 (1981).
53. A Title VII disparate treatment argument was firmly rejected in DeSantis v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). Title VII is limited strictly to
the traditional meaning of "sex" discrimination. Interestingly, the case followed an earlier
decision that discrimination against a transsexual as such, rather than as a female or a male,
is not protected by Title VII. Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1977)(colleagues unable to cope with transsexual during and after transition). Similarly, a
disparate impact argument was rejected in DeSantis as an attempt to "bootstrap" Title VII
protection for homosexuals, cf. Sneed, J. dissenting, who would have been willing to admit
evidence that a disproportionate number of males were homosexual to establish disparate
impact against males. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 333-4.
54. Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph, Co., 24 Cal. 3d
458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979)(Regulated public utility could not dismiss em-
ployees merely for being homosexual; protected under State Constitution, State Public Util-
ities Code and State Labor Code).
55. In Britain, there is a general statutory protection against Unfair Dismissal (wrong-
ful discharge) in Part V of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978 ch. 44, but
homosexuals do not in practice receive the same level of protection against arbitrary dis-
charge as heterosexuals. Job-related heterosexual misbehavior has to be proven to justify a
dismissal. See Treganowan v. Robert Knee Ltd. & Co., [1975] Indus. Cas. R. 405
(Q.B.)(Dismissal justified because employee's unwelcome revelations about personal life and
sexual activities made workplace intolerable for fellow employees). In contrast, employee
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tively unprotected by the law as long as present prejudices endure.
However, a third definitional problem has been resolved in the face
of similarly strong cultural traditions, that is, the characterization of sex-
ual harassment as discrimination under Title VII. Sexual harassment was
almost certainly never contemplated as a form of discrimination by any of
the framers of anti-discrimination legislation, but it is a strong example
of adverse treatment analysis. Harassment clearly demonstrates elements
of less favorable treatment (detriment, malignant motivation and lack of
justification). Even the narrowest "sex only ' 5' approach would have to
characterize it as "sex" discrimination. Harassment of women in employ-
ment is a serious social problem both in the United States5 7 and in Eu-
rope,58 and the ongoing development of a broad definition of harassment
by the EEOC and some American jurisdictions 9 provides a lead which
misconduct or employer detriment is likely to be inferred from the mere fact of homosexual-
ity. See Saunders v. Scottish National Camps Association Ltd., [19801 Indus. Rel. L. R. 174
(EAT), aff'd [1981] Indus. Rel. L. R. 277 (Ct. of Session). (Only police and employer knew
employee was homosexual, but dismissal justified on grounds of effect on employer's busi-
ness of possible adverse customer reaction). Only the most innocuously placed homosexuals
are likely to succeed, Bell v. The Devon & Cornwall Police Authority, [1978] Indus. Rel. L.
R. 283 (homosexuality of canteen cook not an acceptable reason for dismissal). See C. BEER,
R. JEFFERY AND T. MUNYARD, GAY WORKERS: TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW (1981).
56. An approach which limits the scope of "sex" discrimination to cases where a woman
is treated less favorably than a man would be treated in identical circumstances on the sole
ground that she is a woman. There is no discrimination if the circumstances are perceived as
inapplicable to men, e.g., pregnancy requirements that women should wear skirts (Schmidt
v. Austicks Bookshops Ltd., [19771 Indus. Rel. L. R. 360 or possess large bosoms (State Div.
of Human Rights on the Complaint of Mary Chamberlain v. Indian Valley Realty Corp., 38
A.D.2d 89 (1970), aff'd per curiam case no. CS21209870, N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal
Bd.)
57. In 1975, 70% of women surveyed by the Working Women United Institute reported
sexual harassment experiences. See Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 10 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 879, n. 2 (1980). In 1976, 90% of women who responded to a questionnaire
published in November edition of Redbook magazine claimed they had experienced sexual
harassment. See C.A. MAcKINNAN, supra note 47, at 2526.
58. See H. Riffault, European Women in Paid Employment, their perception of dis-
crimination at work 5860 (Dec. 1980)(study conducted in the nine Community member
States at the request of the "Ad Hoc" Commission of the European Parliament for
Women's Rights). In the Community overall, 6% of women surveyed complained of "sexual
blackmail," 7% in Britain, and 8%, the highest proportion, in France. In Britain, sexual
harassment is coming to be recognised as a social and legal issue, see Rubenstein, The Law
of Sexual Harassment At Work, 12 I1nus. L.J. 1 (1983). A recent pamphlet points out that
there seems to be a serious problem although research in the U.K. is as yet "embryonic,"
and recommends that a test case be brought under the Sex Discrimination Act as soon as
possible. See A. SEDLEY AND M. BENN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT WORK (NCCL, 1982).
59. Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11, which define sexual harass-
ment as "[ulnwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or phys-
ical conduct of a sexual nature." Id. at § 1604.11(a). Three criteria are set out:
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as a basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably




IV. "SEX-PLUS" DISCRIMINATION-WIVES AND MOTHERS
The most fundamental area of debate over the definition of "gender"
discrimination is undoubtedly that of family status. Working women suf-
fer "sex-plus" discrimination which flows from the physical and cultural
consequences of gender. Wives, expectant mothers and mothers with de-
pendent children often suffer dismissal or exclusion from employment
and employment opportunities. Indeed, cultural stereotyping of the
"proper" female role in the family is the cause of the employment segre-
gation that limits both the pay and the career aspirations of most women.
The problems of family status and equal pay, to be considered below, are
two sides of the same coin. European law is specific: "[T]here shall be no
discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex, either directly or indirectly
by reference in particular to marital or family status . ." 0 This provi-
sion goes further than either United States or United Kingdom law at
present.
Three overlapping issues arise under the rubric of family status: mar-
riage, pregnancy, and parenthood. Pregnancy is the only condition of the
three unique to women, but all three entail the same consequences for
working women. Married men and fathers (other than single parents) do
not suffer from "sex-plus" discrimination, due to social stereotypes of the
family responsibilities of men and women.
Sexual stereotyping can clearly be seen in discrimination against
married women. In the United States, flight attendants have provided the
litigation which tests the boundaries of Title VII, but they have achieved
comparatively little. Disappointingly, the courts have held that where
only women were employed as flight attendants a no-marriage rule was
hostile or offensive working environment." Id.
Conduct has to be considered in the light of all the circumstances, including the nature and
context of the unwelcome behavior. Id. § 1604.11(b). The Guidelines go on to impose vicari-
ous liability on the employer for harassment by agents or supervisors, Id. § 1604.11(c), and
direct liability on the employer for harassment by nonsupervisory coworkers where the em-
ployer knew, or should have known, of the harassment and does not take "immediate and
appropriate corrective action." Id. § 1604.11(d), (e). See Note, New EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination because of Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment under Title VII,
61 B.U.L. REV. 535 (1981), where the cases are discussed and compared to the Guidelines,
and the author concludes that the guidelines go further than current jurisprudence in that
they (i) do not require employer knowledge to impose vicarious liability for harassment by
supervisors and (ii) do not so far impose direct liability for the actions of coworkers. Id. at
546-47. The Guidelines have been cited with approval and applied in the leading case of
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981), though the decision itself turned on
unremedied harassment by supervisors well known to the employer.
60. Art. 2.1 of Council of Directive 76/207/EEC, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 40
(1976). "[Tlhis term should be interpreted as referring to hidden discrimination which
might in practice affect workers of one sex as a result of marital or family status being taken
into account." (Answer given by Commissioner Richard to European Parliament Written
Question #2295180 by Mrs. Liziu, 30 April 1981).
1984
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
not discrimination because there were no male flight attendants who were
treated better.6 ' These decisions are unfortunate, because equal opportu-
nity cases, unlike equal pay claims, do not require an actual comparison
between men and women (although males who have been treated more
favorably will be highly relevant to the plaintiff carrying the burden of
proof.) Equal opportunity cases merely require a consideration of whether
a man (such as a member of the flight crew) would have been treated
more favorably in the same circumstances. The decisions have lost much
of their impact due to the hiring of male flight attendants. This allows
the courts to rule that a no-marriage provision applied to the female staff
alone is discriminatory. 2 However, the major interpretative step that the
marriage bar itself reflects social stereotyping, impacts exclusively on
women, and therefore constitutes "sex" discrimination has not been
taken. The EEOC has decided that a "sex-neutral" marriage bar contra-
venes Title VII; the fact that it is facially neutral is "irrelevant". 3 Ameri-
can courts have not followed this administrative lead, so the law contin-
ues to allow marriage bars which are applied to both sexes.
The inadequacy of the American approach led the United Kingdom
to include a second ground of discrimination, marital status, in its Sex
Discrimination Act.6 This was a welcome statutory recognition of an im-
portant bar to equal opportunity, but judicial treatment of the provision
has shed an interesting light on the prejudices of British judges; it has
been narrowly construed to apply only to those actually married.6" In
Skyrail Oceanic v.Coleman,66 for example, the Employment Appeal Tri-
bunal (EAT) considered the case of a female travel agency clerk whose
fiance worked for a rival firm. Their competing employers privately
agreed that one of the two would have to be discharged after the marriage
and accordingly Mrs. Coleman was dismissed. The EAT, later supported
by Lord Justice Shaw's dissent in the Court of Appeal,6 7 took a "marriage
only" approach; the woman's dismissal was lawful because it was based
not on her sex or marital status, but on the fact that she had become a
61. EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 578 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1978); Stroud v. Delta Air
Lines, 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1977).
62. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
63. Neal v. American Airlines, Inc., EEOC Dec., Case No. 665759, C.C.H. EEOC Dec.
(1973) 1 6002 at 4015 (June 20, 1968).
64. Supra note 28, § 3.
65. Bick v. Royal West of England Residential School foru t -,- [ , Tns. Rel.
L. R. 326 (Engaged woman lawfully dismissed immediately prior to marriage because she
had not yet acquired protected marital status). Cf. Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph, Inc. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 487, n. 16. (Supreme Court of California refus-
ing to exclude applicants for employment from Cal. Labor Code protection of "employees,"
§§ 1101, 1102):
Such an anomalous interpretation of these statutes would allow employers to
thwart the legislative purpose of protecting citizens by merely advancing their
discriminatory practices to an earlier stage in the employeremployee relations.
66. Skyrail Oceanic Ltd. v. Coleman, [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 596.
67. [1981] Indus. Cas. R. 864, 873-74.
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businesss risk to her employer.
This approach refuses to recognize that the two employers had
jointly decided to dismiss the woman, due to the "male breadwinner"
stereotype.6 8 If Mr. Coleman had been employed by Skyrail, he would not
have been dismissed, and, fortunately, the majority of the Court of Ap-
peal felt this was a clear case of unlawful sex stereotyping.0 9 This is a
strong and welcome precedent to guide British tribunals in the treatment
of marital discrimination. American jurisdictions require legislation or
similar judicial analysis for Title VII to cover the same ground.
In contrast, American treatment of pregnancy discrimination exposes
the inadequacies of British law. In both jurisdictions, the courts have had
to deal with a conceptual problem, because pregnancy may be regarded as
so unique a female disability that pregnant women cannot be compared
with men: "When she is pregnant, a woman is no longer a woman. She is
a woman. . .with child, and there is no masculine equivalent."70
Unitl 1976 this was not seen as a problem in America. The EEOC
and all six circuit courts of appeal which considered the point found that
pregnancy discrimination violated Title VII. In General Electric v. Gil-
bert, however, the Supreme Court overturned this body of law and held
that pregnancy discrimination fell outside Title VII. An employer's bene-
fit plan which excluded coverage for pregnancy disabilities was held not
to constitute gender discrimination because the plan was otherwise even-
handed and pregnancy-related disabilities were regarded as an additional
68. In evidence, respondents admitted that: "We came to that decision (that is, to dis-
miss Mrs. Coleman) on the assumption that the husband was the breadwinner." See also
Short v. Poole Corporation, [1926] 1 Ch. 66 (married women schoolteachers dismissed
before single women or men on grounds that they could rely on husbands for support).
69. "The courts, both in the United Kingdom and the United States, have adjudged
that general assumptions, or as they are called in the United States, "stereotyped assump-
tions," do amount to discrimination against women." Per Lawton L.J., [1981] Indus. Cas. R.
864, 870.
70. Turley v. Allders Departmentt Stores Ltd., [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 66, 70 (Bristow, J.)
(dismissal of pregnant women not unlawful because no male equivalent). See Pannick, Sex
Discrimination and Pregnancy: Anatomy is Not Destiny, 3 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1
(1983). On the same lines, see also Geduldig v. Aiello 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (no violation of
Equal Protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment where California insurance program cov-
ered a substantial number of disabilities but specifically excluded coverage of pregnancy and
related ailments). "There is no risk from which men are protected and women are not." Id.
at 4967). Rafford v. Randle Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc., 348 F.Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla.
1972). Rationale applied to Title VII in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
71. Pointed out in the dissent of Justice Brennan in Gilbert. The federal courts distin-
guished as inapplicable to Title VII the inconsistent 14th Amendment decisions in Cleve-
land Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave violated
due process) and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion of pregnancy from disa-
bility program not in contravention of Equal Protection Clause). Justice Brennan summa-
rized the exclusion of pregnancy from disability benefits as having "the intent and effect of
providing that only women [are subject] to a substantial risk of total loss of income because
of temporary medical disability!" General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146-47.
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risk unique to women. 2 Gilbert was followed in Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty,73 where the majority affirmed that it was lawful to deny sick pay
(or maternity benefits) to pregnant employees. However, in that case, se-
niority rights were also affected by maternity leave, and the court felt,
somewhat inconsistently, that this did constitute sex discrimination, be-
cause it imposed an unjustifiable and substantial burden on women which
adversely affected their employment opportunities."
The Senate Human Relations Committee paraphrased the Gilbert
decision as saying: "[E]ven though only women are affected by pregnancy,
and even though the ability to become pregnant is the fundamental dif-
ference between genders, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not
sex discrimination. ' 75 Unhappy with this interpretation, Congress in 1978
reversed Gilbert and characterised pregnancy discrimination as sex dis-
crimination in the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title VII:7 1
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work ....
The question remains, why did the Supreme Court dedicate three major
decisions to a "distinction without a difference"?77 The answer is: policy.
In all three major cases the Supreme Court was concerned with the enor-
mous social cost to employers required to extend pregnancy coverage to
their employees. The Satty decision incorporated a benefit/burden test
whereby denial of seniority benefits fell within Title VII because it cost
women more, and employers less, than exclusion of pregnancy disability
coverage. Denial of seniority benefits imposed a burden on women that
men would never have to bear, and thus effectively reduced their salaries.
The benefit/burden test has been characterized as more semantic than
real." The action of Congress, which did no more79 than to restore the
72. General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-39.
73. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
74. Id. at 14143. In terms of analysis of principle, it is impossible to distinguish be-
tween the two types of discrimination in this case. Women employees denied seniority after
matcrnity leave suffered only because thp.y had been pregnant: women who took ordinary
sick leave were not discriminated against. Justice Stevens, concurring, criticized the distinc-
tion as "mere semantics" because "[a]s a logical matter, the favored class is always benefit-
ted and the disfavored class is equally burdened." Id. at 154, n. 4. In both types of discrimi-
nation, the favored class consisted of nonpregnant employees, men and women, and the
disfavored class of pregnant women only.
75. S.RE P. No. 331 (to accompany Sec. 995), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
76. Pub.L. No. 95555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). § 701(k) of the Civil Rights Act 1964. See
Wald, Judicial Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title
VII: Ignoring Congressional Intent, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 591 (1982).
77. Coyne v. Exports Credits Guarantee Department, [1981] Indus. Rel. L. R. 51, 54.
78. Note, The 1978 Amendment to Title VII: The Legislative Reaction to the
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intended scope of Title VII, ° is welcome.
Policy also lurks behind the decision of the English Employment Ap-
peal Tribunal in Turley v. Ailders Department Stores.8' The woman con-
cerned had been continuously employed for less than 26 weeks, 2 and
hence she fell outside the specific statutory protection against "unfair dis-
missal" on the grounds of pregnancy. 3 The majority clearly felt she was
seeking an illicit "backdoor" remedy,84 but was unable to see that the two
types of statutory protection, unfair dismissal and sex discrimination, are
separate remedies to separate types of problems.85 The American experi-
ence is persuasive evidence that pregnancy discrimination necessarily
falls within the proper scope of "sex" discrimination. It is time for the
Court of Appeal or the Employment Appeal Tribunal to bring the letter
of English law back within the spirit of the Sex Discrimination Act8" and
Geduldig-Gilbert-Satty Pregnancy Exclusion Problem in Disability Benefits Programs, 27
Loy. L. REV. 532, 569 (1981).
79. Supra note 76, § 701(k) does not require an employer to provide pregnancy benefits
as such; the employer may choose to provide no disability benefits at all. The Amendment
simply requires evenhanded treatment with regard to the provision or otherwise of benefits.
80. The dissent of Justice Brennan in Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146-47, emphasized that
pregnancy discrimination properly fell within the spirit and ultimate objective of Title VII.
Gilbert flew in the face of decisions by 18 Federal District Courts, 7 Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal, and nearly half of state courts interpreting state fair employment laws: Civil Rights
Act of 1964 Pregnancy Discrimination, Pub .L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749. Even after Gilbert, some state courts continued to
characterize pregnancy discrimination as contrary to their state laws. See Note, The 1978
Pregnancy Discrimination Act: A Problem of Interpretation, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 607, 617
(1980).
81. Turley v. Allders Department Stores Ltd., [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 66.
82. The then minimum qualification period (now one year) under the Trade Union and
Labour Relations Act 1974 for entitlement to the general statutory employment protection
right against "unfair dismissal," or statutory wrongful discharge, now contained in the Em-
ployment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, Part IV. The Act, as amended by the Em-
ployment Act 1980, creates a comprehensive code of rights to maternity leave, maternity
pay, the right to return to work, time off work during pregnancy, and protection against
unfair dismissal of the grounds of pregnancy. For a critical survey concluding the code is too
flawed to provide an adequate level of protection, see Upex and Morris, Maternity Rights
Illusion or Reality?, 10 INDUs. L.J. 218 (1981).
83. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978 ch. 44 § 60 (formerly Employ-
ment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71 § 34).
84. "The situation of pregnant women in industry and commerce is dealt with by Sec.
34 . . . of the Employment Protection Act 1975. . . . The (Sex Discrimination) Act makes
no express provision for cases of discrimination against pregnant women because they are
pregnant .... " Turley v. Allders Department Stores Ltd., [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 66, 69
(Bristow J.).
85. See dissent of Ms. Pat Smith:
This argument does not conflict with the Employment Protection Act . . .
[which gives rise to automatic rights]. The Sex Discrimination Act would not
give an automatic right; it would give a much more limited right, resting on a
comparison with other employees; a right not to be singled out for dismissal for
pregnancy a female condition as distinct from other medical conditions.
Id. at 71.
86. The disparate treatment analysis suggested by Ms. Smith is simple and convincing:
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within the requirements of European Community Law. 7
The third and most contentious aspect of family status is parenthood
and the problem of discrimination against mothers with dependent chil-
dren. Child-bearing and child-rearing were described by the European
Parliament as inescapable facts for most working women.8 8 The Social
Action Programme included the objective "to insure [that] the family re-
sponsibilities of all concerned may be reconciled with their job aspira-
tions."8 9 Two years later, this aim was embodied in the Equal Treatment
Directive, 76/207/EEC, 90 a legislative guideline in fairly specific terms,
which obliged member states to pass legislation implementing the princi-
ple of equal treatment. Article 2.1 specifically includes "marital or family
status" within the definition of "sex" discrimination. The issue is whether
the law in the United States or the United Kingdom measures up to this
"sex-plus" definitional standard. (The United Kingdom, unlike the
United States, is obligated to meet this standard, as are all EEC
members.)
As it happens, the only Supreme Court contribution to the first dec-
ade of Title VII was in this area of family status. In Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp.," the Fifth Circuit considered the automatic rejection of
plaintiff's application for employment as an assembly trainee on the
grounds that she had "pre-school age children." Men with dependent
children were allowed to continue their applications. The court took the
"sex-only" approach; that plaintiff had been rejected, not soley because
she was a woman, but because she was a woman with dependent children.
The legislative history shows that Congress had already rejected such an
approach in drafting Title VII on the grounds that it would "emasculate"
the statute,92 and the Supreme Court swiftly overturned the Fifth Circuit
in a brief per curiam decision.93 Comparing "like with like," men with
preschool age children were treated better than women in the same posi-
tion. This constituted unlawful gender discrimination and it was irrele-
"1. Did the applicant's pregnancy incapacitate her in her job? [if not] 2. Would the em-
ployer have treated a man in similar circumstances differently that is, a man requiring time
off for a medical condition who is not incapacitated in his job." Id. at 71.
87. Under the Equal Treatment Directive, 76/207/EEC, 19 O.J. Eua. COMM. (No. L 39)
40 (1976). See supra note 60 and accompanying text and infra note 88 and accompanying
text.
88. "Childbearing and child care [are] inevitably the distinguishing features of the fe-
male employment pattern .... Dismissal because of pregnancy is an unacceptable prac-
tice." Opinion of European Parliament upon proposed Equal Treatment Directive, Com-
ment No. 8, 1974-1975 Eur. Parl. Doc. (No. 39.856) 13 (1975). "[M]aternity, an essential
human function, should also be regarded as a vital social function, not as an automatic bar
to women's employment." Id. preamble, at 5.
89. Council Res. of 21 Jan. 1974, 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 13) 1 (1974). See note 37
supra.
90. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 40 (1976).
91. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
92. 110 CONG. REc. 13,825 (1964)(remarks of Sen. Case).
93. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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vant that many other women were not discriminated against. The Su-
preme Court then went on, however, to assert that an employer might
legitimately exclude mothers with dependent children if the employer
could show there was a greater likelihood that a woman's work perform-
ance would suffer because of conflicting family obligations. This would be
a defense under the "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) excep-
tion to Title VII, whereby an employer may justify less favorable treat-
ment of members of one sex as "reasonably necessary for the normal op-
eration of that particular business or enterprise." '9 4 In his separate
opinion, Justice Marshall pointed out that this pronouncement was
plainly wrong. To demonstrate, he chose the most difficult cases, where
an employer could prove that most women with dependent children
would find it difficult to work efficiently in certain types of business oper-
ations (one obvious example might be night work). Even here, he said,
Title VII does not allow an employer to utilize a sex-based test based on
"ancient canards about the proper role of women. '95 Legitimate sex-neu-
tral performance standards must be set, and an employee must be given
the chance to meet them.96 The bona-fide occupational qualification ex-
94. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(2)(a) (1976). The EEOC re-
gard the BFOQ as an extremely narrow exception, justified only "[w]here it is necessary for
the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, e.g. actor or actress." 29 C.F.R. §
1604.2.(a)(1977), but the analysis applied by the courts is wider. See Note, Dothard v. Rawl-
inson: A Method of Analysis for Future BFOQ Cases, 16 URB. L. ANN. 361 (1979)(two stage
analysis; employer must show (i) qualification or characteristic is necessary rather than tan-
gentially related to the job; and (ii) all or substantially all members of one sex do not pos-
sess that qualification). The "all or substantially all" formulation has been criticized as
overbroad by depriving those persons who could do the job of the protection of Title VII.
See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAnv. L. REV. 1109, 1179-80 (1971). Nonetheless, even under the
wider test enunciated in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the majority in Phillips
seems to have gone too far, the Court commenting in the later case that "the BFOQ excep-
tion was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception .... " Id. at 334. The British
equivalent of the BFOQ is the "genuine occupational qualification," § 7, Sex Discrimination
Act, note 28 supra, which sets out in § 7(2) various criteria familiar to the American reader:
(a) reasons of physiology (excluding strength) or authenticity (in dramatic per-
formances) relating to the "essential nature of the job"; (b) decency or privacy;
(c) jobs involving singlesex accommodation where it would be unreasonable to
expect the employer to change; (d) special establishments such as hospitals or
persons where the inmates are all of one sex and it would be reasonable to
limit employees to members of that sex having regard to the "essential charac-
ter of the establishment"; (e) "personal services" most effectively provided by
members of one sex; (f) statutory regulations; (g) employment in foreign
maledominated countries; and (h) jobs of married couples.
The National Council for Civil Liberties has severely criticized the GOQ as being excep-
tionally overbroad, see J. Coussins, The Equality Report 61 (1976).
95. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971).
96. Compare the judgment of the Industrial Tribunal in Thorndyke v. Bell Fruit
(North Central) Ltd., [1979] Indus. Rel. L. R. 1, 5:
Many would share [the] view that a woman with or without a husband, with
three very young children is unlikely to be able to do justice to a demanding
fulltime job involving possibly abnormal hours, if she is to give her young chil-
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ception ought to be construed narrowly and, certainly, may not be predi-
cated on "characterizations of the proper domestic roles of the sexes."
Justice Marshall concluded: "[w]hen performance characteristics of an in-
dividual are involved, even when parental roles are concerned, employ-
ment opportunity may be limited only by employment criteria that are
neutral as to the sex of the applicant."'9 "
But even Justice Marshall did not fully realize the extent of the
problem. If an employer raises a facially neutral employment bar against
persons with dependent children, is that the end of the matter? Commu-
nity law would certainly regard this as unlawful discrimination on the
grounds of family status, contrary to Article 2.1 of directive 76/207/
EEC98 . The question was considered by the EAT in Hurley v. Mustoe 9
The complainant was dismissed shortly after commencing work as a wait-
ress for two to three nights a week from 6 to 11:30 in the evening when
her employer learned she had four children under the age of 11. The EAT
found, as in the Phillips case, that there was evidence of adverse treat-
ment; comparing "like with like," the employer would not have treated
married men with children in the same way. 100
However, the EAT went further and subjected the case to an adverse
impact analysis, in the event that it was mistaken in holding that there
was a discriminatory "no women with dependent children" requirement.
Assuming that there was a facially neutral "no dependent children" con-
dition of employment, the EAT concluded that there was a disproportion-
ate impact upon married women, a de facto marriage bar, and was there-
fore unlawful. As has been seen, British legislators were careful to
embody marital status as a ground of sex discrimination. Hurley v. Mus-
toe is an effective illustration of the type of case where a requirement
which is aimed at women and exclusively affects women, but which is
expressed in facially neutral terms, may be struck down in terms of "sex-
plus" discrimination. 101 A meaningful and effective definition of discrimi-
dren all the material attention they may need, and which, if any conflict of
duties arises, many would still regard as the primary call on a woman who has
chosen to have children. Nevertheless ... it amounts in law to unlawful dis-
crimination. A woman with young children can choose, and in some cases may
be obliged by circumstances, to take employment which may possibly create
difficulties for them, and for her and for her employer. Whether one likes it or
not, she is not to be denied that opportunity merely because she has young
children. It is up to the employer to make sure she does comply properly with
the job requirements and to dismiss her after due warnings if she does not.
97. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971).
98. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 40 (1976).
99. Hurley v. Mustoe, [1981] Indus. Cas. Rev. 490; see Docksey, Indirect Discrimina-
tion and the Protection of Mothers, 10 INDuS. L.J. 188 (1981).
100. The employer claimed his "no dependent children" requirement was facially neu-
tral, on the basis of an alleged refusal to hire a deserted husband with three children, see
The Daily Telegraph, Feb. 24, 1981, at 3, but a male single parent is a "like" comparator
only for a female single parent, not a married person living with her spouse.
101. Especially since the Sex Discrimination Act, like Title VII, makes no mention of
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nation must include all the physical and cultural disabilities flowing di-
rectly from sex. A definition which excludes the protection of married
women with children is inadequate, and dangerously close to the "sex
only" approach of the 5th Circuit in the Phillips case. A Supreme Court
concerned about job segregation and inadequate implementation of the
spirit of equal opportunity under the Civil Rights Act ought to reconsider
the definition of "sex" discrimination and include not only pregnancy but
also marital and parental status.
V. EQUAL PAY
The council would, in my view, fail in their duty if, in administering
[public] funds . . they . . . allowed themselves to be guided in pref-
erence by some eccentric principles of socialistic philanthropy, or by a
feminist ambition to secure the equality of the sexes in the matter of
wages in the world of labour." 0 2
Times have changed since the above decision in 1925, and to modern
eyes it seems simple and unexceptional that working men and women
should be paid the same for doing the same. However, the potential for
debating the proper scope of the "equal pay for equal work" remedy is
enormous. There are three main possibilities: a woman's work may be
compared with that of a man which is (a) identical, (b) substantially
equal, or (c) merely comparable. 10 3 The American and British Equal Pay
Acts were deliberately worded quite narrowly0 4 and are targeted at par-
family status. Justice Browne Wilkinson asserted that "Parliament has legislated that it is
up to each mother to decide whether or not she goes out to work and employers may not
discriminate against them just because they are mothers." Hurley v. Mustoe, [1981] Indus.
Cas. R. at 496. However, Parliament deliberately limited the wording of the Act to marital
status and the problem of the marriage bar (Jenkins, 889 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) col. 513
(1975); Harris, 362 PARL. DEa. H.C. (5th ser.) col. 98 (1975)); a proposed amendment in the
Lords to add the words "or parent" was blocked by the Government (363 PARL. DEB. H.L.
(5th ser.) col. 967-75 (1975)) as it was "a new issue of major importance" (per Lord Harris,
id. at col. 974, 1). The Equal Treatment Directive was treated very superficially: "[it]
would, I think ... have required us to introduce this kind of legislation" (per Lord Colville,
362 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) col. 174 V 1 (1975)), and the Government clearly did not
consider that the rejected amendment was necessary to bring the Act within art. 2.1 of the
Directive. The judgment in Hurley, whilst purporting to implement the will of the legisla-
ture, has in fact overridden it and brought English law within the requirements of Commu-
nity law. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
102. Roberts v. Hopwood, [1925] A.C. 578, 594 (Lord Atkinson) (equal wages for women
paid by borough council set aside as excessive, ignoring market conditions; members of
council in breach of public duty, personally surcharged for amount of excess).
103. "While the standard of equality is clearly higher than mere comparability yet
lower than absolute identity, there remains an area of equality under the Act the metes and
bounds of which are still indefinite." Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238 (5th
Cir. 1973). See also Bowers and Clarke, Four Years of the Equal Pay Act, 130 NEW L.J. 304
(1980).
104. The American Bill as originally drafted provided an "equal wages for comparable
work" test, 108 CONG. REC. 14,767 (1962), which was felt to be too broad and was narrowed
by replacing "comparable" with "equal," 108 CONG. REc. 17,441 (1962).
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ticular pay injustices rather than general social or economic change. The
Acts draw a bright line for courts; equal pay claims may be addressed
when:
(a) women and men are working for the same employer in the same
establish ment;
(b) a woman does the same work as a man;0 5
(c) the woman is paid less; and
(d) the employer cannot demonstrate a legitimate reason uncon-
nected with gender to justify the pay differential."'
Within these constraints, the courts have developed a remarkably
creative parallel jurisprudence on both sides of the Atlantic. The "sex-
only" problems of perception already discussed, which bedevil equal op-
portunity legislation, have not figured significantly in the area of equal
pay. The courts decided early on that the test of "equal work 10 7 or "like
work"108 used in comparing a man's work with that of a woman, is not
limited to identical work but to work which is "substantially" equal."0 '
105. Or, under the British Act, where the woman's work has been rated equivalent to
the man's following a job evaluation study: § 1(2)(b). Once the study has been completed a
woman may sue to have it applied notwithstanding the employer's refusal to implement.
O'Brien v. SimChem Ltd., [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 573. Because it is up to the employer, how-
ever, to initiate and complete the job evaluation, with no provision for evaluation by the
courts, the United Kingdom has been found to be in breach of the Equal Pay Directive.
Commission v. U.K., [1982] Indus. Cas. R. 578 (ECJ). British law is being changed to bring
it into line with the requirements of the Directive. See infra note 161 and accompanying
text.
106. The American Equal Pay Act authorizes pay differentials "made pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any factor than sex .... " 29 U.S.C. §
206(d)(1) (1976). Exclusions from the British Equal Pay Act are differently drafted. Supra
note 30, § 1(3) of the Act authorizes pay differentials "genuinely due to a material difference
(other than sex)," the equivalent of the American exception (iv). See infra note 148. Sec.
6(1) excludes compliance with protective legislation, and Sec. 6 (2) excludes "terms related
to death or retirement, or to any provision made in connection with death or retirement."
Even this narrow formulation has proved broader than, and to that extent void as inconsis-
tent with, art. 119 of the Treaty of Rome. See infra note 145.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(1976).
108. Equal Pay Act 1970, supra note 30, § 1(2)(a).
109. "Congress in prescribing 'equal' work did not require that the jobs be identical,
but oniy that they must be ~ sAstnial equUl. :ytc ..... ud.esro
remedial purposes of the Act . . . (which) . . . sought to overcome the ageold belief in
women's inferiority and to eliminate the depressing effects on living standards of reduced
wages for female workers and the economic and social consequences which flow from it."
Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265. (3d Cir. 1970)(Freedman, J.). Compare the
explanation of "like work" in Sec. 1(4) of the British Act:
A woman is to be regarded as employed on like work with men if, but only if,
her work and theirs is of the same or a broadly similar nature, and the differ-
ence (if any) between the things she does and the things they do are not of
practical importance in relation to terms and conditions of employment; and
accordingly in comparing her work with theirs regard shall be had to the fre-
quency or otherwise with which any such differences occur in practice as well
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The courts take a common sense approach and evaluate what actually
happens in practice, rather than compare conditions of employment"' or
job title classifications."' Moreover, it is the job taken as a whole, rather
than its individual segments, which forms the basis for comparison." 2
This has provided a relatively wide scope for equal pay remedies. In one
British company, a female cook dealing with an average of 10 to 20 meals
a day in the director's dining room was held to be doing "like work" with
a male cook in the company's canteen, who provided 350 less sophisti-
cated meals per day. 1" 3 In both countries, the courts seek to locate a func-
tional core common to both jobs being compared, and then to consider
whether differences outside the core-function are such as to justify the
pay differential. It is often appropriate where there is an unavoidable ex-
ternal differential, such as night work, to take an intermediate approach.
The night work and day work are regarded as "equal work," but a shift
differential may be authorized over and above a common basic rate for
the job itself, regardless of time of performance."
4
The exceptions to the Equal Pay Acts," 5 which authorize otherwise
discriminatory pay differentials, have similarly caused little trouble for
the courts of either system. Problematic justifications such as "market
forces" have been firmly limited. For example, an employer may not pay
a new male employee more than existing women employees on the basis
of "market forces." The market is not a legitimate ground for discrimina-
tion in pay since it embodies and will perpetuate the discriminatory pay
differentials targeted by the legislation. The courts have developed a
as the nature and extent of the differences.
110. Redland Roof Tiles, Ltd. v. Harper, [1977] Indus. Cas. R. (E.A.T.) 349 (male clerk-
typist performing "like work" with women despite having to serve briefly as transport su-
pervisor). Cf. Interpretative Bulletin , 29 C.F.R. § 800.130 (temporary supervisory duties
must be available equally to both sexes to justify pay differential). Where difference in du-
ties is significant, differential will be justified. Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co, 493
F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974)(male "exchange teller" found to have more complicated duties than
female "note tellers").
111. U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Administrator's Regulations, 29 C.F.R.
Sections 800.121-123 (1979). See Wirtz v. Versail Mfg., Inc., 58 Lab. Cas. (CCH) V 32,047
(N.D. Ind. 1968)(men on "heavy work" pay schedule, women paid less on "light work"
schedule; classification irrelevant because women did same work as men); Wirtz v. Midwest
Mfg. Corp., 58 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 32,070 (S.D. Ill. 1968) (men paid more in Class I than
women in Class III but all performed substantially the same work).
112. Usery v. Richman, 558 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1977). While a woman was able to
substitute for a man in terms of his individual work assignments, the overall work for which
he was responsible was not substantially the same as that of the women. The overall job and
not its individual segments must form basis of the comparison.
113. Capper Pass Ltd. v. Lawton, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 26.
114. Dugdale v. Kraft Foods Ltd., [1976] Indus. Rel. L.R. 368 (No. 2), [1977] Indus.
Rel. L. R. 160. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). A higher basic rate for
night work may be justified in exceptional circumstances, such as difficulty in recruiting
night workers at day work basic rate. Kerr v. Lister & Co. Ltd., [1977] Indus. Rel. L. R. 259.
115. See note 106 supra.
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"personal equation" analysis " ' whereby individuals must be compared
with individuals in their particular circumstances, taking into considera-
tion factors such as qualification, experience and seniority, rather than
comparing external circumstances, such as higher pay elsewhere.'
1 7
The personal equation approach may be seen in the judicial response
to "red circles."' 18 An employer may justify salary differentials in favor of
certain employees which have been preserved in "red circles," but only in
individual terms flowing neither directly nor indirectly from sex discrimi-
nation. Thus, it is acceptable to "red circle" the salary of an employee
who becomes ill and is moved to a less demanding and normally less well-
paid job." His particular circumstances justify the salary differential be-
tween himself and female colleagues. Similarly, an employer may tempo-
rarily assign an employee to a less well paid job and "red circle" his nor-
mal wage during the assignment. 20 However, an employer cannot
116. "[T]he personal equation of the woman as compared to that of the man" per Lord
Denning M.R. in Fletcher v. Clay Cross (Quarry Service) Ltd., [1979] 1 All E.R. 474, 477,
applying dicta of Lord Denning M.R. in Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd. [1979] 1 All
E.R. 456, 464.
117. "[T]he courts in the United States had held that the Act was violated even though
the employer had no intention to discriminate . . . [and] . . .even though market forces
brought about the difference in pay." Fletcher v. Clay Cross (Quarry Service) Ltd. [1979] 1
All E.R. 474, 478. In fact, there are two meanings to "market forces," one lawful and one
unlawful. Unlawful market forces flow from stereotyped assumptions as to the pay expecta-
tions of women, prevailing wages, etc. See Fletcher note 116 supra, Pointon v. University of
Sussex, [1979] Indus. Rel. L. R. 119; Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.
1973); Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hospital, 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970). Lawful mar-
ket forces are economic factors acting upon the employer, such as a rundown in business,
Albion Shipping Agency v. Arnold, [1982] Indus. Cas. R. 22 (E.A.T.), or reduced profitabil-
ity, Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1973); Jenkins v. Kingsgate
(Clothing Productions) Ltd., [1981] Indus. Cas. R. 592 (E.C.J.) and 715 (E.A.T.). In princi-
ple, the economic factors should be outside the employer's control and not a pretext for sex
discrimination, see infra notes 155 and 157. Where "comparable work" is concerned, how-
ever, market forces have been approved wholesale. Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d
353 (8th Cir. 1977). "We do not interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the
market in setting wage rates for genuinely different work classifications." Id. at 356, cited
with approval in Lemmons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229, (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 244 (1980). The Title VII analysis of the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits is erroneous, in principle, and inferior to preexisting equal pay anaylsis.
118. "Unusual, higher than normal, wage rates" (29 C.F.R. § 800.146) which reflect
sme factor peronal tn pqrticular employees which are not based on sex. "Red circle" is
not a term of art or proposition of law but simply a "shorthand description of a particular
state of affairs." Methven v. Cow Industrial Polymers Ltd., [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 463, 469
(C.A.) (Dunn L.J.).
119. The example cited in the Interpretative Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 800.146. See also
Methven v. Cow Industrial Polymers Ltd., [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 463, 469; Outlook Supplies
Ltd. v. Parry, [1978] Indus. Cas. R. 388 (look at all circumstances, including length of time
elapsed since the "protection" was introduced) (E.A.T.); Charles Early & Marriott (Witney)
Ltd. v. Smith and Ball, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 189 (E.A.T.) (9 year period of "protection" not
necessarily suspect).
120. See Interpretative Bulletin, Temporary Reassignments, 29 C.F.R. § 800.147 (1976),
which specifies one month as the normal maximum period of "temporary" reassignment.
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permanently "red circle" the pay of long serving employees to preserve
differentials existing before the employment protection legislation came
into full force as this would simply perpetuate sex discrimination. 2 '
In general, therefore, the courts seem to have interpreted equal pay
legislation satisfactorily, and it is a surprise to find that women's pay has
actually declined, relative to men's, over the last five years.12 2 The reason
is that the Equal Pay Acts are inadequately drafted in three major re-
spects. 123 First, they do not allow a person claiming equal pay to compare
herself with a hypothetical member of the opposite sex in similar circum-
stances, the famous "hypothetical male" or "notional man." Because a
woman must be able to compare herself with an actual male colleague, it
is impossible for most women, segregated into traditional areas of female
employment, 24 to make a successful claim for equal pay. Second, it is not
possible to claim equal pay for work of equal value. 2 5 And third, com-
121. Snoxell and Davies v. Vauxhall Motors Ltd., [1977] Indus. Rel. L. R. 123 (EAT),
following Corning Glass Works v. Brennan 417 U.S. 188 (1974). See also United Biscuits
Ltd. v. Young, [1978] Indus. Rel. L. R. 15 (E.A.T.)("Red circle" must be perfect, must not
have a discriminatory origin, and all persons within it must be employed at time anomaly
creating "red circle" existed). In both jurisdictions there have been unexpected results
where an employer has raised the pay of women employees to bring them into line with
their male colleagues, only to suffer litigation at the hands of males paid less than the up-
graded women's salaries. See opposite results in Board of Regents of University of Ne-
braska v. Dawes, 522 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1975) (differential solely because were women) and
Ministry of Defense v. Farthing, [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 705 (C.A.) (differential on personal
basis).
122. The average salary of fulltime working women in the United States has dropped
from 63% of the salaries of fulltime male workers in 1956 to 59% in 1977, comparing me-
dian earnings for women and men in 1956 ($2,827 v. $4,466) and 1977 ($8,618 v. $14,626).
Women's Bureau, U.S. Dept. of Labor, The Earnings Gap Between Women and Men 6
(1979). See also Khan, The British Equal Pay Act - Some Developments, 11 ANGLO-AM.
L.R. 89, 108-10 (1982). In the United Kingdom, womens's average gross earnings dropped
from a peak equivalent of 75.5% of men's earnings in 1977 (L 1.77.4 v. L 1.33.9) to 73.9% in
1982 (L3.54.8 v. L2.62.1). See EOC: Seventh Annual Report (1982).
123. In January, 1981, the EOC wrote to the Secretaries of State for Employment and
the Home Office proposing 25 amendments to the Sex Discrimination Act and the Equal
Pay Act, including the amendments to the Equal Pay Act suggested in this text. See EOC
News, February/March, 1981 at 1, 4-5.
124. Women remain clustered in low status, poorly paid, and relatively unskilled occu-
pations. Two thirds of American female workers hold sales, service or clerical jobs. L. HOWE,
PINK COLLAR WORKERS, INSIDE THE WORLD OF WOMEN'S WORK 16 (1977). Comparatively few
women hold "professional" jobs, Levy, 'Comparable Worth' May Be Rights Issue of '80s,
Washington Post, Oct. 13, 1980 at 20, col.3. British women are similarly situated, see EOC:
Fourth Annual Report (1979), most women remained clustered in "women's jobs." A signifi-
cant element of both low pay and job segregation is parttime work, which tends to impact
upon women and to be grossly underpaid; three-quarters of all female British part-time
workers earned less than $150 per week in 1982. See Williams, The Low Paid in Britain,
London Times, Nov. 20, 1982, at p. 3, col. 7, and see infra notes 152 and 156.
125. The examination of "fair comparisons and fair differentials, the basic issues which
the courts have by and large avoided," can only be achieved by allowing job evaluation. "It
is time to put away the restrictive notion of 'like work' in favour of equal value." Bowers
and Clarke, supra note 103, at 305-306. British law is being changed to this effect, see infra
note 165 and accompanying text.
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plainants are confined to disparate treatment analysis in pleading equal
pay claims. This has allowed employers to defend pay differentials on
grounds such as mobility or full-time work, which do not directly discrim-
inate on the sex of the complainant. Such reasons or requirements, how-
ever, often have a demonstrable impact upon a disproportionate number
of women, particularly married women with families or single parents,
and would constitute a prima facie case of adverse impact discrimination,
requiring the employer to demonstrate a legitimate justification related to
the requirements of the enterprise.' It is not surprising, therefore, that
126. The burden of proof will differ depending on whether plaintiff pleads disparate
treatment or disparate impact, but three factors are common to the U.S. and the U.K.:
(1) Direct evidence of discrimination is usually difficult or impossible to provide, so that
it is necessary to allow circumstantial evidence to create inferences. Gates v. GeorgiaPacific
Corp., 326 F.Supp. 397, 399 (D.Ore. 1970), aff'd, 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974); Wallace v.
South Eastern Education and Library Board, [1980] Indus. Rel. L. R. 193, 195. See Note,
The Prima Facie Case Approach to Employment Discrimination, 33 MAINE L. REv. 195,
204 (1981).
(2) Substantive law deals with this problem by dividing the "burden of proof" into the
burden of persuasion, which remains with plaintiff (Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981); Oxford v. Department of Health and
Social Services, [1977] Indus. Cas. R. 884, 886 (E.A.T.)), and the evidential burden, which
may shift to defendant (IX Wigmore on Evidence § 2485 (3d. ed. 1940); Oxford v. D.H.S.S.,
[1977] Indus. Cas. R. 884).
(3) A three-part, shifting burden analysis is common to disparate treatment and impact
cases. First, a "prima facie case" must be shown by plaintiff. This is simply a set of facts
which establish that plaintiff was treated differently than members of the opposite sex (Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Moberley v. Commonwealth Hall
(University of London), [19771 Indus. Cas. R. 791, 79394 (E.A.T.)), or that facially neutral
practices fall more heavily on women than on men, (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971); Steel v. U.P.O.W., [1978] Indus. Cas. R. 181, 187-88). The evidential burden
then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption raised by the prima facie case that
there was unlawful discrimination. Defendant must "articulate some legitimate, nondiscrim-
inatory reason" for the adverse treatment or justify the requirement on the ground of busi-
ness necessity (McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Wallace, [1980] Indus. Rel. L. R. at
195). In both jurisdictions, "business necessity" may be applied strictly (Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Steel, [1978] Indus. Cas. R. at 18788) or more loosely,
especially, where health and safety is concerned (Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F.Supp.
35, 42 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd 579 F. 2d 43 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979);
Panesar v. Nestle Co., Ltd., [19801 Indus. Cas. R. 144 (C.A.)). If the employer discharges
this burden, it returns to plaintiff, who must then prove that defendant's reasons are pretex-
tual. In disparate treatment cases, plaintiff must prove unlawful intent (Texas v. Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253; Bindman, Pruving Di ...urnimrm ,. I TLe -A-- ,en TT. _, : La cy
Gazette, Dec. 17, 1980 at 1270). In disparate impact cases, where specific intent is not a
factor, plaintiff must rebut defendant's evidence or demonstrate some viable alternative (Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 425; Steel, [1978] Indus. Cas. R. at 188). The EAT
has tried to simplify the evidential process for industrial tribunals coping with the "rather
nebulous" concept of shift in the evidential burden period. The tribunal should concentrate
on whether the employer has given a clear and specific explanation of the conduct in the
questioned period, and if the employee has not, then discrimination may simply be inferred
from the primary facts. See Khanna v. Ministry of Defence, [1981] Indus. Cas. R. 653, 658-
59. Comparing the two systems, two conclusions emerge:
(i) English cases impose a heavier burden on plaintiff in disparate treatment cases, for
example, where plaintiff in practice needs to show she is better qualified than the successful
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the current debate in the United States, the United Kingdom and the
EEC centers on the availability of an equal pay remedy alternative to the
equal pay legislation.
In the United States, individuals and the EEOC have turned to Title
VII to provide a broader area of comparison of equal pay. The first hur-
dle, which has taken several years to surmount, is the problem of whether
Title VII may be pleaded in pay cases at all. The courts had to decide the
impact of a floor amendment.. 7 to Title VII known as the Bennett
Amendment:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this sub-
chapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in de-
termining the amount of wages or compensation paid or to be paid to
employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by
provisions of Section 206(d) of Title 29.128
The courts were divided on whether to apply a narrow or broad in-
terpretation to the Bennett Amendment. Under the broad view, equal
pay cases could be pleaded under Title VII subject to the four exceptions
set out in the Equal Pay Act.129 Under the narrow view, the Bennett
Amendment reserved equal pay cases totally to the Equal Pay Act, so
that Title VII is limited to the scope of the provisions of the earlier
Act. 130
male applicant. Commentators recommend a shift in the legal burden once a prima facie
case has been established, see Pannick, The Burden of Proof In Discrimination Cases, 131
NEW L.J. 895, 896 (1981).
(ii) In disparate impact cases arising out of layoffs, English law ought to provide better
protection for women, who tend to lack seniority due to past discrimination, because there
is no "seniority" exception equivalent to § 703(h), and the only issue before the Tribunal is
whether the requirement of seniority in a particular case is justifiable, see Steel, [1978] In-
dus. Cas. R. at 187-88. But cf. Clarke and Powell v. Eley (IMI Kynoch Ltd.), [1983] Indus.
Cas. R. 165 (EAT held selection of parttime workers for redundancy was unlawful because
of disparate impact upon women but approved obiter the practice of "last in, first out"); see
also Docksey, Part-Time Workers, Indirect Discrimination and Redundancy, 46 MOD. L.R.
504 (1983). In the U.S., however, the seniority exception has been applied to require proof of
discriminatory intent even in adverse impact cases, regardless of whether the act of discrim-
ination allocating seniority took place before or after Title VII became effective. See Ameri-
can Tobacco Company v. Patterson, 50 U.S.L.W. 4364, 4366-7 (1982).
127. 110 CONG. REC. 13,647(1964)(remarks of Sen. Bennett).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2(h)(1976). Pub. L. No. 88352, tit. VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 255
(1964).
129. City of Los Angeles, Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978). The "broad" view would have two consequences: (1) complainants could claim equal
pay under Title VII against any fellow employees rather than being limited to colleagues in
the same "establishment"; and, (2) complainants may argue that their work, although differ-
ent, is of equal value, or "comparable worth," to that of a man.
130. Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975)(en
banc)(stronger evidence of Congressional intent required to justify "questionable" exten-
sions of the scope of Title VII). The cases leading up to the Supreme Court decision in
Gunther are analyzed in the Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under Title VII: Equal
Pay for Equal Work or Equal Pay for Comparable Work? 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.. 421,
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The question was finally addressed by the Supreme Court in County
of Washington v. Gunther.' Four women formerly employed as guards
in the female section of a county jail claimed back pay under Title VII.
Their work was not substantially equal to that of male colleagues in the
men's section, so that no Equal Pay Act remedy was available, but it had
been assessed by the employer as being of equal value.. 2 and had been
intentionally depressed on the grounds of sex.
The Supreme Court took a broad view of the Bennett Amendment,
and held that Title VII wage claims are not limited to the Equal Pay
Act's equal work test. 3 3 Otherwise, the Court noted, "a woman who is
discriminatorily underpaid could obtain no relief-no matter how egre-
gious the discrimination might be-unless her employer also employed a
man in an equal job at the same establishment at a higher rate of pay."'3
The Court concluded that "Congress surely did not intend the Bennett
Amendment to insulate such blatantly discriminatory practices from judi-
cial redress under Title VII."' 3'
Gunther was the first 3 6 of a series of cases planned by the EEOC,
which regards it as a significant victory but stresses that Gunther is only
a gateway to further litigation.1 3 7 It is now up to American courts to work
out the scope of "equal value" or "comparable work" claims under Title
VII.' Two recent developments in the European Community may pro-
vide some helpful ideas as to the potential scope of remedies under the
470-482 (1981).
131. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
132. The employer had evaluated the women's jobs as worth 95% as much as the men's
jobs, but only paid the women 70% as much. Id at 162.
133. At this stage, one cannot say more about Gunther because the Court's decision is
so narrow. It remains that Title VII may be pleaded where there is evidence of intentional
suppression of a woman's salary on account of her sex. In practice it would provide no more
latitude than the pre-amendment scope of British law. Where an employer has conducted
but refuses to implement a job evaluation under the EPA § 1(5), it may nonetheless be
enforced by the employee under § 1(2)(b) of the Act. O'Brien v. SimChem Ltd., [1980] 1
W.L.R. 1011 (H.L.), noted in Thompson 97 LAW Q. REV. 5 (1981). The dissent in Gunther
felt that the Court's "narrow holding is perhaps its saving feature" (per Rehnquist J; Burger
C.J., Stewart and Powell JJ concurring, at 203), but that in principle the majority were
wrong, that "the legislative history of both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII clearly establish
that there can be no Title VII claim of sex-based wage discrimination without proof of
'equal work.'" Gunther, 452 U.S. at 204.
13. Gunthe, 45 .. sat .. 0~t %AastilV JCm ha
135. Id. at 179.
136. In fact, the first case of "comparable worth" to reach the Supreme Court was Lem-
ons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 244
(1980), a relief to advocates of comparable worth, who had tried to discourage plaintiffs in
Lemons from filing for certiorari because the case, unlike Gunther, did not involve inten-
tional discrimination. It was felt more appropriate that the Supreme Court's first exposure
to comparable worth under Title VII should involve intentional discrimination. See Legal
Times of Washington, June 30, 1980, at 8, col.2.
137. See LEACH AND OWENS, supra note 26, at 39.
138. See Newman and Vonhof, Separate but Equal Job Segregation and Pay Equity in
the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 269.
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Equal Pay Act and Title VII in the future.
A. Equal Pay
In the United Kingdom, the narrow scope of the Equal Pay Act has
caused dissatisfied equal pay litigants, supported by the EOC, to resort to
the European Court of Justice for redress under article 119 of the Treaty
of Rome. Indeed, in one case, counsel deliberately conceded the argument
in English law, notwithstanding an express invitation from the Bench to
argue the point, in order to compel a reference to the Court of Justice on
the scope of article 119.'31 Counsel's tactics proved successful; the subse-
quent decision of the Court of Justice has become one of the leading au-
thorities in this area.
140
The "founding father" of equal pay law under article 119 is a woman,
Gabrielle Defrenne, a Belgian flight attendant employed by Sabena Bel-
gian Airlines. Ms. Defrenne's conditions of employment were inferior to
those of her male colleagues in several ways. Women were paid less, were
obliged to retire earlier (at age 40) and received inferior pension provi-
sions. Three times she fought her way through the Belgian courts to the
European Court of Justice, losing twice and succeeding once, and her per-
sistence has established a corpus of Defrenne jurisprudence which gov-
erns the scope of article 119.141 This has been refined through a series of
recent cases challenging the narrow scope of the British legislation,"42 but
significantly extended only once, in the Jenkins case.
The Defrenne analysis of article 119 is as follows:
(1) Article 119 is limited to "pay" discrimination on the basis of sex.
Broader remedies must be looked for in further legislation at the Commu-
nity level or national level.
1 4 3
(2) A woman may compare her pay to that of a man working1 44 for the
139. Oral argument in Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., [19801 Indus.
Rel. L. R. 6, (exchange between Sir Gordon Slynn and Anthony Lester, Q.C.)(unreported).
140. In holding art. 119 is capable of a disparate impact analysis.
141. Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 3), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1365; Defrenne v. Sabena
(No. 2), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455; Defrenne v. Belgium, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
445. See Burrows, The Promotion of Women's Rights by the European Economic Commu-
nity, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 191, 192-200 (1980).
142. See generally Bridge, National and Transnational Regulation of Equal Pay for
Equal Work in England and the European Community, 5 J. EuR. INTEGRATION 117 (1982);
Crisham, The Equal Pay Principle: Some Recent Decisions of the European Court of Jus-
tice, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 601 (1981); Thomson and Wooldridge, Equal Pay, Sex Dis-
crimination and European Community Law, LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 1 (1980).
143. Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 2), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 473, 18; Macarthys
Ltd. v. Smith, [19811 1 All E.R. 111, 119, 15.
144. Or who has previously worked for that employer. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, [1979]
3 All E.R. 325 (C.A.), [1981] 1 All E.R. 111 (E.C.J.), 120 (C.A.). See Schofield, Requirements
of Community Law, 9 INDUS. L.J. 173 (1980). The EAT held that the wording of the Equal
Pay Act would allow a comparison with a male predecessor. See Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith,
[1978] 2 All E.R. 746. But the majority of the Court of Appeal construed the statute nar-
rowly as requiring a coterminous male comparator, necessitating a reference to the Court of
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same employer. 45
(3) "Pay" is broadly defined to include any consideration, whether in cash
or in kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of
his employment.1 46 Such consideration may be noncontractual and inci-
dental to employment so long as it is linked to the employment. 147
Justice on the scope of art. 119. In the U.S., the broader interpretation favored by the EAT
and the Court of Justice is likely to be applied to the Equal Pay Act. See 1 A. Larson,
Employment Discrimination in Sex, § 29.70 "Sequent Inequality" (1979), citing Murphy,
Female Wage Discrimination: A Study of the Equal Pay Act of 1963-70, 39 U. CINN. L.
REv. 615, 633 (1970); Wirtz v. Koller Craft Plastic Products, Inc., 296 F.Supp. 1195 (E.D.
Mo. 1968); Wirtz v. Versail Mfg., Co., 58 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 32,047 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
145. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, [1981] 1 All E.R. 111. The requirement of present or
prior common employment represents an important policy decision by the Court of Justice.
Advocate-General Capotorti urged the Court to decide that art. 119 did not require the
existence of an actual male comparator employed or formerly employed by that employer.
Id. at 117. This "notional" or "hypothetical male" analysis was rejected by the Court, which
limited art. 119 firmly to the "equal work" approach and left the equal value remedy un-
equivocally to national legislation implementing the Equal Pay Directive. Id. at 119 14 &
15.
146. Art. 119(2). See Worringhan v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., 31 Common Mkt. L.R. 1
(1981)(discrimination in contributions to employer's pension fund by men and women under
age 25 affected determination of salary and entitlement to benefits, and was therefore sex
discrimination contrary to art. 119). Any private pension arrangements provided directly or
indirectly by the employer which discriminate against women in what they pay or receive
may be regarded, after the decisions in Worringham and Garland, infra note 147, as likely
to be contrary to art. 119. Community law now offers a similarly flawed protection to that
presently afforded under Title VII. See generally Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F.Supp. 1271
(D. Ore. 1975)(payment of inferior monthly retirement benefits to women violative of Title
VII); City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 98
S.Ct. 1370 (1978)(higher contributions paid by women to pension fund violative of Title VII;
implication that unequal benefits would also be unlawful); EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d
1139 (1st Cir. 1978)(employer indirectly responsible for provision of inferior pension benefits
to women by independent insurer); Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association
475 F.Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)(independent variable annuity company held liable under
Title VII as an "employer," construed functionally, for providing unequal benefits based on
sex-segregated mortality tables). See Bernstein and Williams, Sex Discrimination in Pen-
sions: Manhart's Holding v. Manhart's Dictum, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1241 (1978); Gold, Of
Giving and Taking: Applications and Implications of City of Los Angeles, Department of
Water and Power v. Manhart, 65 VA. L. REv. 663 (1979); Kistler and Healy, Sex Discrimi-
nation In Pension Plans Since Manhart, 32 LAB. L.J. 229 (1981). See also Ellis and Morrell,
Sex Discrimination in Pension Schemes: Has Community Law Changed the Rules? 11 IN-
DUS. L.J. 16 (1982); McCullum and Smith, EEC Law and United Kingdom Occupational
tuu ocunfes, 2 Eurc. L.R. 2oo (19 7); iludr, Eu Puy fur Men und vumen: Two
Recent Decisions of the European Court," 30 AM. J. Comp. L. 627 (1982).
147. Eileen Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., [19821 Indus. Cas. R. 420 (E.C.J.
and H.L.). The Court of Justice held that special travel facilities extended to spouses of
retired male employees constituted discrimination contrary to art. 119, against retired fe-
male employees whose spouses do not enjoy the same facilities. "The argument that the
facilities are not related to a contractual obligation is immaterial. The legal nature of the
facilities is not important for the purposes of art. 119 provided they are granted in respect
of the employment." Id. at 434, 10. The Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of
Appeal disagreed on the interpretation of § 6(4) of the Sex Discrimination Act (exempting
"provision in relation to death or retirement"). The EAT took a "narrow" view (exemption
did not apply to employment privileges allowed to continue after retirement), see [1978]
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(4) "Pay" does not include, however, contractual provisions which are the
result of statutory policy, such as public pension schemes.
1 48
(5) A facially neutral requirement which results in a differential in pay
and which has a disproportionate impact upon members of one sex must
be objectively justified on grounds other than gender.
Part (5) of the Defrenne analysis flows from the recent case of Jen-
kins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd." 9, decided on 31st March
1981, two months before Gunther. In that case, part-time and full-time
workers performed the same work but were paid different rates for the
job. There were both men and women full-time workers but only women
part-time workers.'5 0 Two questions arose: (i) is part-time work compara-
ble to full-time work, is it the same "job" and, if so, (ii) is the pay differ-
ential justified? Mrs. Jenkins had a strong case under the British Equal
Pay Act, since the work was identical, and there was arguably no "genu-
ine material difference"'' between the two jobs. Instead, counsel con-
ceded the point and requested the court to refer the issue to the Court of
Justice to consider the scope of article 119.
The response of the Court of Justice has broad implications; it did
not content itself with considering "equal work" under standard disparate
treatment equal pay analysis-i.e., is this woman paid less than a male
colleague? Instead, it declared that article 119 is capable of the disparate
impact analysis formulated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.'52 and applied to gender discrimination in Dothard v. Rawlin-
Indus. Cas. R. 495. The Court of Appeal reversed, comprehensively interpreting § 6(4) to
cover any provision about retirement, see Eileen Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd.,
[19791 Indus. Cas. R. 558. Having received the opinion of the Court of Justice, the House of
Lords sidestepped the problem of the clash between article 119 and the subsequently en-
acted British statute by construing § 6(4) in the light of article 119 and adopting the "nar-
row" interpretation advanced by the EAT. For the noncontractual coverage of art. 119, see
also the Submission of Advocate-General Warner in Worringham v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., 31
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 14 (1981) (covering Christmas bonuses).
148. Defrenne v. Belgium (80/70), 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 445. See also Burton v.
British Railways Board [1982] Indus. Cas. R. 329 (E.C.J.)(male employees unable to take
voluntary early retirement as early as female employees because eligibility for voluntary
redundancy (lay-off) benefits scheme linked to statutory retirement ages for men and
women. Held that Community Law under Directives 76/207/EEC and 79/7/EEC does not
prohibit discrimination in affording access to retirement benefits linked to minimum pen-
sionable age fixed by national social security legislation).
149. Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 24 (1981).
See Barrett, Part-Time Workers and Equal Pay: The Case of Jenkins v. Kingsgate, 6 HuM.
RTs. REV. 174 (1981).
150. There was one male parttime worker; a former fulltime worker rehired after retire-
ment for a trial period as an exceptional case. The facts do not disclose if he remained, but
suggest his salary would have been "red circled."
151. § 1(3) of the Equal Pay Act exempts pay differentials, regardless of "like work,"
which the employer can prove are "genuinely due to a material difference (other than the
difference of sex)." The defense was successful in Handley v. H. Mono. Ltd., [1979] Indus.
Cas. R. 147, see infra note 153. The equivalent exception appears in 29 U.S.C. §
206(d)(1)(iv), see note 106 supra.
152. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849 (1971)(unnecessary employ-
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son.'5 s The disparate impact analysis considers whether these persons are
paid less than other persons because of an unjustifiable requirement or
condition that has a disproportionate impact upon women. Full-time
work may be characterized as a facially neutral requirement for higher
pay. However, if the complainant can demonstrate a disproportionate im-
pact of the requirement upon women workers,154 it is presumed that there
is pay discrimination contrary to article 119 unless the employer can
demonstrate an economic justification for the requirement."" When the
Employment Appeal Tribunal received the preliminary ruling of the
Court of Justice, it was able to apply, for the first time and contrary to
precedent,156 disparate impact analysis to the Equal Pay Act, thereby
ment tests constituted unlawful race discrimination because of disproportionately large im-
pact on black workers).
153. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720 (1977)(statutory height and
weight requirements which could not be shown to be necessarily job-related were unlawful
sex discrimination because excluded disproportionate amount of women).
154. "Ample material has been placed before us to show that in the Community as a
whole, about 90 percent of parttime workers are women, mostly married women with family
responsibilities." Submission of Advocate-General Warner, Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing
Productions) Ltd. 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 24, 29 (1981). The AdvocateGeneral cited a Commu-
nication from the Commission to the Standing Committee on Employment of 17 July 1980,
entitled "Voluntary Part-Time Work," Coin (80) 405 final, to show that in 1977, 93 percent
of parttime workers in the United Kingdom were women, the highest proportion in the
Community, including Germany. The Commission submitted a Draft Directive on Voluntary
PartTime Work to the Council on January 4, 1982, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C62) 7 (1982).
Member States will be obliged to pass legislation by January 1, 1984 to create a new head of
disparate treatment protection (pursuant to art. 10). Disparate treatment of parttime work-
ers is prohibited under art. 2, and their pay is required to be "in proportion" to that of
equivalent fulltime workers (art. 4). Employers will no longer be able to argue a business
justification defense under disparate impact analysis.
155. As in the disparate treatment case of Handley v. H. Mono Ltd., [19791 Indus. Cas.
R. 147, where the employer paid parttime workers less than fulltime workers and success-
fully argued economic grounds as a "genuine material difference" defense under Sec. 1(3) of
the Equal Pay Act. The EAT accepted the fact that the economic return from parttime
workers was less than from fulltime workers because each worker had a machine allocated to
her and the employer obtained proportionately less output from the part-timers. However,
the decision was strongly criticized in principle, for allowing the employer to pay less for the
same work because it has less economic value, and in practice, for allowing this in a context
where the employer is responsible for the lower return on capital by choosing to underutilize
machinery. See Wallington, Position of Part-Time Workers, 8 INDUs. L.J. 237 (1979). The
same conflict of opinion can be seen in Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589
(3d Cir. 1973). The majority therein held that economic benefits to the employer flowing
from greater profits earned by salesmen in the men's department were a "factor other than
sex" justifying the wage differential, under 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv). Judge Van Dusen, dis-
senting, felt that the employer was responsible for the segregation of women in the less
profitable women's department and had not shown that the reason for the segregation was
other than sex. As in Handley, the economic justification flowed from a decision by the
employer which was not based on business necessity.
156. Meeks v. N.U.A.A.W., [1976] Indus. Rel. L. R. 198 (complainant able to demon-
strate disparate impact on women due to fulltime work requirement for higher pay, but case
dismissed on ground that Equal Pay Act limited to disparate treatment).
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harmonizing that statute with the Sex Discrimination Act. 157
The application of the Defrenne/Jenkins approach to the Equal Pay
Act could be a powerful weapon against "women's jobs" in the United
States, where 69.5% of part-time workers are women aged between 25
and 65.'5 It is surprising that disparate impact analysis, which was for-
mulated in the United States, has not been applied to the Equal Pay Act,
and that government guidelines specifically state that facially neutral pay
discrimination against part-time " or temporary'"s workers is not
unlawful.
B. Equal Value
The impact of the Defrenne/Jenkins analysis is limited to claims in-
volving the same kind of work performed within a common employment.
The wider concept of "equal value" was placed firmly by Defrenne
outside the scope of article 119, requiring further measures at the Com-
157. Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., [1981] Indus. Cas. R. 715
(E.A.T.), wherein BrowneWilliamson, J., commented that the "Equal Pay Act was an inte-
gral part of one code against sex discrimination, and the rest of the code plainly rendered
unlawful indirect discrimination even if unintentional." The EAT was unsure whether art.
119 had been interpreted as applying to cases of disparate impact discrimination, and there-
fore simply expanded the scope of English law. This is a welcome decision, since the Com-
mission had already noted unfavorably the absence of a disparate impact analysis from the
Equal Pay Act in its Report to the Council of Feb. 11, 1981. That report assessed the situa-
tion as of Aug. 12, 1980 with regard to the implementation of the principle of equal treat-
ment for men and women, Corn (80) 832 at 17 final. The case was remitted to an industrial
tribunal to determine whether the pay differential was in fact "objectively justified," i.e,
necessary to enable the employers to reduce absenteeism and to obtain the maximum utili-
zation of their plant.
158. Employment and Training Report of the President: 1981, Appendix A (Persons on
voluntary parttime schedules). The 1980 figures show that 30.5% of parttime workers were
male, 69.5% female. In the critical age group of 25-44 years, only 7.2% of parttime workers
were men, but 42.7% were women.
159. "No violation of the equal pay standards would result if the difference in working
time is the basis for the pay differential, and the pay practice is applied uniformly to both
men and women." Interpretative Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 800.150 (1976). Interestingly, al-
though the Bulletin only applies a disparate treatment analysis to parttime work, it goes on
to qualify the nature of genuine parttime work, which should normally be for working weeks
of 20 hours or less. Where parttimers are composed of workers of one sex and work 30-35
hours a week, as opposed to fulltime work of 40-45 hours a week, its nature as part time
work will be in doubt and there may well be sex discrimination, Id. In Jenkins, part-timers
worked 30 hours per week, fulltimers 40 hours, and sex discrimination could have been
found on a disparate treatment analysis, applying the Bulletin's interpretation.
160. The payment of different wages to temporary workers, such as seasonal help, is
"not necessarily" illegal "where payment of such differential conforms with the nature and
duration of the job and with the customary practice in the industry and the establishment,
and the pay practice is applied uniformly to both men and women." Interpretative Bulletin,
29 C.F.R. § 800.150 (1976). As with temporary reassignment, see note 120 supra, employ-
ment over one month may be suspect, though it has been suggested that temporary employ-
ment is not generally regarded as a camouflage of sex discrimination. See Sullivan, The
Equal Pay Act of 1963: Making and Breaking A Prima Facie Case, 31 ARK. L. Rv. 545,
603-604 (1978).
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munity or national level for provision of redress.' These measures now
exist.
At the Community level, the Equal Pay Directive, 75/117/EEC,"'6 re-
quires member states to enact national legislation on equal pay, including
the concept of equal value. At the national level, relevant legislation now
exists in all the member states. 68 In member States such as Germany and
Eire, the legislation is based exclusively upon the Equal Pay Directive,
and there is an unfettered right to claim equal pay for work of equal
value. National courts have been obliged from the outset to evaluate dif-
ferent jobs sought to be compared for the purposes of claiming equal pay.
In the United Kingdom, however, the Equal Pay Act does not provide
complainants such an unfettered right to allege a "comparable work" test
before the courts. Instead, Section 1(5) of the Act requires a prior job
evaluation by the employer, which establishes in effect an inquiry by the
employer as constitutive of the right to an equal value claim. The Euro-
pean Commission obtained a decision from the Court of Justice that this
condition is contrary to the Directive, which requires that it must be pos-
sible to initiate the assessment of allegedly comparable work, if necessary
in adversary proceedings, notwithstanding the wishes of the employer. 1'
The United Kingdom is thus in breach of the Treaty of Rome until it
alters the Equal Pay Act to provide an effective right to claim "compara-
ble work." The Government has accordingly submitted a draft amend-
ment to the Act to Parliament,'65 but it is widely regarded as inadequate
in several important respects and thereby in breach of the Directive.'66
161. See note 143 supra. The Court of Justice has implicitly recognized the clear inten-
tion of the member States that progress in social law reform should be by way of harmoniza-
tion of national action rather than direct Community action. See Treaty of Rome, supra
note 1, arts. 117 and 118, and the European Social Action Programme, note 37 supra. These
provisions all contemplate action by the member States, with each State's mode of reform
reflecting its own peculiar legal and cultural background. Hence three of the four Directives
and Draft Directives in this area have been made under the authority of art. 100 (approxi-
mation of laws). Only one, the Equal Treatment Directive, was made under art. 235 (new
Community legislative activity).
162. 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (L 45) 19 (1975).
163. See Report of the Commission to the Council on the Application of 12 February
1978 of the principle of equal pay for men and women, Coin (78) 711 final. The scope of the
report was criticized as inadequate by the European Parliament Committee on Social Af-
fairs, Employment and Education, 1979-1980 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 56.361) 98 (1979)(Re-
port of 2 May 1979).
164 Commission v. United Kingdom, [19821 Indus. Cas. R. 578 (ECJ). See supra note
105. For the art. 169 enforcement procedure, see note 44 supra.
165. Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983, draft debated in House of Commons
July 20, 1983, 46 PARL. DaB. H.C. (5th Ser.) col. 479-98 (1983).
166. Some problems are, inter alia, that the amendments do not come into force until
one year after the Regulations come into effect, cases are excluded where there are job eval-
uation or other studies, burden of proof is shifted to the claimant and criteria for assessing
work of equal value are inadequate. See Leading Counsel's Opinion on the Proposed
Amendments to the Equal Pay Act 1970 (Anthony Lester Q.C.), 24 February 1983 (EOC,
1983).
See also Young, Alas, He Was Sober, Times, Jul. 24, 1983, at 13: "The weaseling mode
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Further litigation supported by the Equal Opportunities Commission is
likely in the near future.
16 7
In the United States, of course, no such direct statutory or Commu-
nity right to an equal value remedy exists, and the question arises
whether and how far equal value is likely to develop in American jurisdic-
tions in the foreseeable future. The author would argue that develop-
ments in Europe will be paralleled in the United States, and that Ameri-
can courts are likely to develop an equal value remedy under Title VII for
employees working for the same employer.
There is a groundswell of public opinion, reflected in the actions of
public employers such as the City of San Jose'" and the State of
Idaho,'" in favour of equal pay for jobs of equal value as a necessary
aspect of achieving social justice in the workplace. Various schemes of job
evaluation exist which may be helpful to the courts; 70 the courts are
themselves already familiar with complex evaluative process under the
rubric of "substantial equality." Recent decisions of the Third and Ninth
Circuits have been favorable to a broader remedy against wage discrimi-
nation under Title VII,' 7' and one may assume that the necessary further
litigation invited by Gunther will be forthcoming, in part because the
structural nature of pay discrimination in traditional women's jobs lends
itself to class actions172 and "quasi-class" claims by the EEOC.178
of compliance the government has selected stands an excellent chance of leaving us in fur-
ther breach, with another long round of litigation to come."
167. See Miles v. Shakespeare Tavern Playhouse, noted in London Times, Aug. 3, 1983,
at 3, col. 1, and Aug. 4, 1983 at 2, col. 4 (Aug. 2, 1983) (Industrial Tribunal held women
could claim equal pay for work of equal value). This case is suitable for referral to the
European Court of Justice for an Opinion upon the direct effect of the equal value provision
of the Equal Pay Directive, art. 1(1).
168. In 1979, the city requested an outside survey of wage comparability. The report in
1981 revealed gross disparities, e.g. nurses paid $9,210 less a year than assistant mechanics,
though jobs were comparable in requirements and responsibilities. The city will spend $1.5
million as a start to correcting such disparities, by raising the salaries of some women's jobs,
such as senior librarians, up to 15%. See The Economist, Aug. 1 1981, at 32, col. 2.
169. Idaho has implemented a comparable worth job evaluation system for state em-
ployees (Idaho Code Sec. 675309B), which has resulted in an average 16% increase for fe-
male workers. See also Gasaway, Comparable Worth: A Post-Gunther Overview, 69 GEo.
L.J. 1123, 1159 (1981)(use of Hay evaluation system resulted in salary increases of 10-20%
for clerical workers, who are predominantly female).
170. Gasaway, supra note 169, at 1155-60. See also National Academy of Sciences,
Women, Work Wages: Equal Pay for Jobs of Equal Value 70-82 (1981); Schwab, Job Eval-
uation and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices, printed in E. LivERNACH, COMPARABLE
WORTH: IssuEs AND ALTERNATIVES 49, 52-70 (1980); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal
Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 721-25 (1980); Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrim-
ination and the 'Comparable Worth' Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 231, 278-
87 (1980).
171. For the contrary view, that the courts are unable to evaluate job content, see
I.U.E. v. Westinghouse, 631 F.2d 1094, 1110 (3d Cir. 1980), (Van Dusen, J., dissenting) cert.
denied 101 S.Ct. 312 (1981).
172. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The class action device is a vital means of providing effective
redress to individuals under Title VII, removing the prohibitive economic burden of litiga-
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It is interesting how parallel social conditions and economic exigen-
cies have produced the development of a concept of equal value at the
same time in both the United States and the European Community. As
developed, equal value will almost certainly be limited to common em-
ployment and will not, therefore, strike directly at market forces and job
segregation. 17 4 It should, however, undermine the economic roots of job
segregation, and remove the financial consequences of "women's work,"
simply by striking effectively, for the first time, at sexist pay differentials
between fellow employees.
VI. CONCLUSION
Women are entering the workforce in greater numbers than ever
before and families increasingly depend on their "second" incomes, but
the situation of women with regard to job segregation and inferior pay
has actually deteriorated since the 1960s. The recession must take a share
of the blame,176 but a comparative perspective shows that there are signif-
icant loopholes in the protective legislation, and that, in its present state,
it has often been both insensitively and inadequately applied. The Jen-
kins case demonstrates the value of an awareness of developments in
other jurisdictions:
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States and this court often find
themselves confronted with similar problems. Although of course the
provisions of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... were
worded differently from art. 119 of the Treaty, their essential purpose
was the same . .. I draw considerable comfort from finding that my
conclusion accords with the conclusions of that court. . . . 76
Surprisingly, there seems to be a growing acceptance of the concept
of comparable worth, without which pay equity is impossible. In the area
of equal pay, more than any other, there are grounds for cautious opti-
mism that injustice may be significantly mitigated by law over the next
few years.
Perhaps the most important grounds for optimism are social rather
than legal. Women have become a significant part of the workforce, and
tion which otherwise deters many litigants from pursuing small claims. Deposit Guaranty
National Bank of Jackson v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). The introduction of this device
into United Kingdom Discrimination law has been strongly advocated. See The Economist,
Feb. 20, 1982, at 13, col. 2. See generally Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 688 (1980).
173. General Telephone Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980) (Com-
mission executing public policy may obtain class-wide relief without being subject to re-
quirements of Rule 23 governing private class action complaints). See LEACH AND OWENS,
supra note 26, at 6-9.
174. See Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980); Chris-
tensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
175. See The Economist, Sept. 25, 1982, at 76-79.
176. Jenkins, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 35-36 (1981)(Advocate-General Warner).
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they are entering higher status occupations and professions in numbers
only dreamed of twenty years ago. 77 Every working woman, and every
successful woman, is both a practical and psychological boost to the
women that follow. For these women, at last, the legislation that now ex-
ists has the potential to play a supporting role.
177. See C.F. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (1981). Ms. Epstein discusses the dramatic rise
in numbers of women entering the legal profession since the passage of Title VII, and points
out, notwithstanding the "primary importance" of the legislation, the level of individual and
collective effort required of women lawyers to succeed.
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